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ABSTRACT 
Scholars are divided on how to assess the Supreme Court’s recent trio of juvenile life-without-parole (“LWOP”) 
cases.  Some extol the cases as exemplars of the Court’s “moral leadership,” heralding a “revolution in juvenile 
justice” and perhaps also auguring shifts in the Court’s jurisprudence of adult punishment.  Others are more 
pessimistic, arguing that the cases solidify a two-track approach in which there is one Eighth Amendment for 
juveniles and one for adults, and the juvenile LWOP cases are unlikely to have any broader significance.  This 
Article doubles down on the latter, more pessimistic reading.  A close reading of the opinions themselves, focusing 
on the Justices’ rhetoric and situating that rhetoric within historical context, reveals that a near-majority of the 
Court (and possibly a majority, with the replacement of Justice Kennedy, although that remains to be seen) 
would not only permit juvenile LWOP sentences but affirmatively favors the project of mass incarceration that 
states have embarked upon in the past forty years.  This wing of the Court reads the Eighth Amendment as 
punishment-facilitating, through the lens of what might be called “carceral conservatism.”  The remainder of the 
Court supports greater procedural regulation of mass incarceration at its extremes, but appears to broadly accept 
the core justifications for lengthy imprisonment for ordinary adults.  This wing of the Court reads the Eighth 
Amendment as punishment-regulating, through the lens of what might be called “carceral proceduralism.”  Far 
from examples of moral leadership, the juvenile LWOP cases may exemplify the Court’s moral uselessness in the 
face of mass incarceration.  This Article concludes by briefly gesturing at some alternative principles that might 
animate a more robust or “carceral skeptic” jurisprudence, drawing on prison abolitionist thought, international 
comparisons, and originalist scholarship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Earlier this year, the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Paroles denied 
parole to Henry Montgomery.1  Henry Montgomery is seventy-one years 
old and has lived at Angola state prison for the majority of his life.2  Now, I 
suppose, he will go on living there.  When he shot and killed a sheriff’s 
deputy in Baton Rouge, in November 1963, he had just turned seventeen, 
and he was sentenced to life in prison.3  The only reason Montgomery even 
had a parole hearing is that, two years ago, the United States Supreme 
Court mandated that Louisiana give him one.  In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
the Court reaffirmed an earlier holding that mandatory life-without-parole 
(“LWOP”) is unconstitutional for juveniles, and further held that this rule 
applies retroactively, even to people like Montgomery who received life 
sentences as teenagers long ago.4  The Court did not require that state 
prison officials actually release Montgomery or anyone else.  Only that they 
 
 1 Associated Press, His Case Helped Change the Law for Juvenile Offenders, But After Serving 54 Years He Was 
Denied Parole, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Feb. 19, 2018), https://atlantablackstar.com/2018/02/ 
19/case-helped-change-law-juvenile-offenders-serving-54-years-denied-parole/. 
 2 Bryn Stole, Will 71-Year-Old Baton Rouge Man who Killed Deputy Leave Prison Before He Dies? It’s 
Possible, ADVOCATE (June 21, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/ 
article_fa13d3a4-5699-11e7-b440-4b5b249d116e.html. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
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think about it.5  People sometimes do horrible things when they are 
“children,” Justice Kennedy wrote, but sometimes those same people 
“change.”6 
Most of Montgomery’s relatives have passed away by now, but he has a 
cousin, who visits him in prison.7  They played together as children, at their 
grandparents’ farm.  “I remember him playing with the horses,” she told a 
newspaper reporter, “teaching me to ride, explaining the different 
animals.”8  As I read about Montgomery’s case, I learned also about other 
children.  Charles Hurt, the sheriff’s deputy, had three children.  His 
daughter, Becky, was nine when she lost her father.9  She is now an adult, 
Becky Wilson, and when two years ago the Supreme Court considered 
Montgomery’s case, she filed a brief urging the justices not to disturb his 
sentence.  “Wilson believes that forgiveness is a personal issue—and she has 
forgiven Montgomery,” the brief explained.10  In fact, although I read this 
somewhere else, Wilson and her sister once visited Angola and met with 
Montgomery.11  But parole hearings would “retraumatize” her and her 
family, she said, “forcing them to relive the events that traumatized 
them.”12  So it seems that no one involved was particularly helped by the 
Court’s ruling.  Not particularly helping anyone is an apt characterization 
of a lot of recent Supreme Court decisions.  The suggestion of this Article is 
that the more representative clue about the likely future trajectory of the 
constitutional law of punishment in the United States is not that the 
Supreme Court ordered Louisiana to provide Henry Montgomery with a 




 5 See id. (explaining that states retain discretion whether to release juvenile offenders, thereby 
ensuring that “[t]hose prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life 
sentences”). 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. 
 8 Stole, supra note 2. 
 9 Brief Amicus Curiae of Becky Wilson & the Nat’l Ass’n of Victims of Juvenile Murderers in 
Support of Respondent at 12, Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280) 
[hereinafter Wilson Brief]. 
 10 Id. at 1. 
 11 Stole, supra note 2. 
 12 Wilson Brief, supra note 9, at 3. 
 13 See Ashley Nellis, For Henry Montgomery, a Catch-22, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:00 
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/02/28/for-henry-montgomery-a-catch-22 (“If 
Henry Montgomery’s situation is any indication of how the Court’s ruling will continue to play 
out across the country, it’s a sad commentary on the meaning of justice today.”). 
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The idea that people might “change” between childhood and 
adulthood—that there is a life stage called “adolescence,” during which a 
person is not yet a fixed character—constituted the central premise of three 
recent cases, including Montgomery’s, in which juvenile justice advocates 
persuaded the Supreme Court to carve out an adolescence exception to the 
constitutional law of criminal punishment.  Though the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,”14 the Court has 
historically interpreted that provision so narrowly that in practice, and 
especially outside of the death penalty context, it does not ordinarily 
function as a meaningful constraint on the government’s power to punish.15  
As it applies to children and teenagers, however, the Roberts Court has 
infused the clause with slightly more meaning.  The Rehnquist Court had 
already held, in 2005, that children under eighteen could not be sentenced 
to death.16  Then, in Graham v. Florida (2010), Miller v. Alabama (2012), and 
finally Montgomery, the Roberts Court took some incremental steps further.  
Pronouncing that “age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,” the Court 
held that children under the age of eighteen may not be sentenced to life-
without-parole for non-homicide crimes, and may be sentenced to life-
without-parole for homicide crimes only upon an individualized sentencing 
determination, invalidating twenty-nine states’ mandatory LWOP statutes 
as applied to juveniles.17  
Some scholars have emphasized the distinctive nature of these cases, 
framing Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as about “kids,” and the ways that 
they are “different.”18  This Article begins from the contrary premise, 
mining the juvenile LWOP cases for clues about the Roberts Court’s 
assumptions and internal divisions on questions of what might be called 
garden-variety adult punishment—the implicit default against which 
juvenile punishment is compared.  This Article performs a close reading of 
these cases, contextualized in historical perspective, to taxonomize a divide 
 
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 15 See John F. Stinneford, The Illusory Eighth Amendment, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2013) 
(characterizing the Eighth Amendment as “illusory” in practice). 
 16 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 17 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 467 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010).  
 18 See, e.g., CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS WAY 
8 (2018) (construing Miller as establishing that “children are different in the eyes of the law”); 
Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 957 (2016) (distinguishing the 
juvenile LWOP cases from the mainstream of the American law and culture of punishment 
because “juvenile crime is a special case”).  But see Paul Litton, Bombshell or Babystep?  The 
Ramifications of Miller v. Alabama for Sentencing Law and Juvenile Crime Policy, 78 MO. L. REV. 1003, 
1004 (2013) (recognizing that Miller raises “questions” about the future of “Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence” more generally). 
Dec. 2018] YOUTH AND PUNISHMENT AT THE ROBERTS COURT 547 
   
 
on the Roberts Court over the “mediating principles,” or purposive 
commitments, that the justices bring to bear when interpreting the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause.19  In the juvenile LWOP cases, a slim 
majority reads the clause through the lens of what might be called “carceral 
proceduralism.”20  From this perspective, imprisonment is generally 
legitimate but, at the extremes and as applied to especially vulnerable 
groups, the Eighth Amendment should be read to impose some modest and 
mostly procedural limits on state power to imprison.  The Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause is interpreted as punishment-regulating, at 
least at the extremes.  The remaining justices read the clause instead 
through the lens of what might be called “carceral conservatism.”21  On this 
view, imprisonment is a positive good because it incapacitates individuals 
deemed risky or violent.  Courts, therefore, should avoid interpretations of 
the Eighth Amendment that would unduly intrude upon state power to 
imprison.  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is interpreted as 
punishment-facilitating, with the set of punishments that are “cruel and 
unusual” assumed to be quite small. 
No wing of the Court, then, reads the Eighth Amendment from a 
starting perspective of frank recognition of the moral travesty of mass 
incarceration—what might be called a perspective of “carceral 
skepticism.”22  Such a perspective might counsel reading the Eighth 
Amendment as far as possible to minimize the state power to imprison.  
Instead of defining the constitutional limits on punishment with reference to 
extreme sentences (such as LWOP) as applied to especially vulnerable 
groups (such as juveniles), as the jurisprudence does at present, a 
jurisprudence oriented around carceral skepticism might instead impose a 
heavy burden on the state to justify the need to imprison in every routine 
case.  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause might be recast as 
punishment-minimizing, defining the set of punishments that are “cruel 
and unusual” more broadly.  Of course, it is aspirational if not fantastical to 
imagine that the current Court would endorse such a principle any time 
soon, but pondering what the Eighth Amendment might mean in the light 
of such a principle is useful as a thought experiment.  Doing so highlights 
 
 19 Borrowing from Owen Fiss, Reva Siegel defines a “mediating principle” as a mode of interpreting 
a particular constitutional provision “purposively to vindicate one particular understanding of the 
concept or value the clause expressly guarantees.”  Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to 
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 n.8 
(2011) (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976)). 
 20 See infra Section II.B. 
 21 See infra Section II.A. 
 22 See infra Part IV. 
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by contrast the limited nature of the Roberts Court’s juvenile LWOP cases 
and their capacity to preserve the status quo of mass incarceration.  There 
may be resources within carceral proceduralism for introducing new 
protections on the margins for exceptional categories of adults, but the 
juvenile LWOP cases cannot be read to encourage a constitutional attack 
on mass incarceration more broadly.  As Judge Nancy Gertner has 
observed, the Eighth Amendment has proven an inadequate tool for 
“deal[ing] with the extraordinary prison terms that we have been imposing 
on defendants across this country for the past three decades.”23  The 
juvenile LWOP cases do not call that assessment into question. 
This Article thus provides a more pessimistic reading of the juvenile 
LWOP cases than many juvenile justice scholars, who have generally 
received these cases with optimism.  Some extol Graham, Miller, and 
Montgomery as exemplars of the Supreme Court’s “moral leadership” and 
predict that they will launch a “revolution in juvenile justice.”24  Others 
have given the decisions a more guarded, but still positive reception, finding 
in Graham and Miller “reasons for optimism” about the possibility of a 
“fairer” juvenile justice regime.25  If nothing else, the cases have “symbolic 
importance,” signaling a new and salutary judicial recognition of “the 
relevance to criminal punishment of differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders.”26  Eighth Amendment scholars, in contrast, have tended to 
emphasize the exceedingly limited nature of the Court’s holdings in Graham, 
Miller, and Montgomery,27 noting that the cases in which the Court has 
actually invalidated death or LWOP punishments affect “only one-
thousandth of one percent of all felony convictions.”28  
 
 23 Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 
1041, 1041–42 (2013); see also Nancy Gertner, On Competence, Legitimacy, and Proportionality, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1585, 1586–87 (2012) (developing this point at greater length). 
 24 DRINAN, supra note 1818, at 7–8. 
 25 Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 71, 74, 105 (2013). 
 26 Id. at 90. 
 27 See generally Litton, supra note 18 (summarizing different views of Miller as “bombshell” or “baby 
step”). 
 28 Stinneford, supra note 15, at 490.  For more optimistic readings, see, for example, William W. 
Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions A Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 67, 102 (2015) (characterizing Miller as a possible “baby step” toward “ending mass 
incarceration”); Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of 
Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 415–16, 419 (2017) (suggesting that Graham and other 
cases reflect an incremental shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “toward a fundamentally 
robust protection” for “the liberty interests of criminal defendants,” in which the Court plays a 
more active role “as an independent arbiter of excessive punishment”).  As Smith and Robinson 
acknowledge, if any such shift is underway it is proceeding extremely gradually; I therefore 
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This Article doubles down on this more pessimistic view of the juvenile 
LWOP cases by emphasizing not only these cases’ doctrinal and practical 
limits but also some troubling implications of the Justices’ rhetoric.  For a 
dark subtheme pervades this line of cases: they inscribe into constitutional 
law an optimistic account of the potential of adolescents, but at the expense 
of introducing into the case law an extremely bleak vision of adults.  Justice 
Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller, for example, relies throughout upon an 
essentialized categorical distinction between “adolescents,” plastic and thus 
presumptively reformable, and “adults,” fixed and thus potentially 
irredeemable.29  Justice Kagan expresses concern not about LWOP as a 
punishment, but only about “subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-
parole sentence applicable to an adult.”30  Although it remains to be seen 
whether or how Miller will be extended beyond the juvenile context, Justice 
Kagan’s Miller opinion could equally be used to shore up the constitutional 
status of LWOP as an acceptable form of punishment, except in very 
limited circumstances.  If so, that outcome could hinder efforts to roll back 
mass imprisonment, for it is the availability (and routine use) of life prison 
terms that makes the United States an extreme outlier, calibrating the 
entire scale of punishment in this country at a very high baseline.31  While 
introducing new procedural limits on the sentencing of children, then, the 
lasting significance of the juvenile LWOP cases could be to reaffirm as the 
default rule that the Constitution imposes no meaningful limits on mass 
 
interpret their analysis more as an aspirational claim about where they hope the Court will go 
than as an empirical description of the Court’s past decisions. 
Though acknowledging that the group encompassed by the juvenile LWOP cases is tiny, 
Stinneford characterizes the case law as “highly protective” of that group, supra note 15, at 491, a 
characterization with which I disagree.  Graham and Miller do not actually preclude serving life in 
prison for any juvenile, they merely require certain procedural formalities (parole hearings in 
Graham—at which parole may be denied—and individualized sentencing in Miller).  See Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80, 489 (2012) (holding “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders,” but “not foreclos[ing] a sentencer’s ability to make [the] judgment” that the “harshest 
possible penalty” is merited, so long as the sentence is not imposed mandatorily); Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give 
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release [i.e., a parole hearing]”). 
 29 Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–74. 
 30 Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
 31 See Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2011) 
(explaining how the anomalous use of life sentences in the United States serves to “anchor” the 
larger “system of over-punishment”); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 950–58 (characterizing 
LWOP as “the paradigmatic example” of imprisonment as banishment, and emphasizing the 
difference between American acceptance of LWOP vs. European rejection of LWOP as 
exemplary of the divide between the two regions’ “cultures of punishment”).  
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imprisonment.  
Rather than examples of moral leadership, then, the juvenile LWOP 
cases exemplify the Court’s moral uselessness in the face of mass 
incarceration.32  In providing a critical reading of the juvenile LWOP 
cases—and especially Miller—this Article highlights themes that are latent 
in the scholarly discussion of these cases, but that merit further emphasis 
and development.  A close reading of the opinions themselves, focusing on 
the Justices’ rhetoric and situating that rhetoric within historical context, 
reveals that a near-majority of the Court that decided the juvenile LWOP 
cases would not only permit juvenile LWOP sentences but has no 
constitutional qualms about, and may even affirmatively favor, the overall 
project of mass incarceration that states have carried out over the past 
several decades.  This near-majority could soon become a majority, 
because of the retirement of Justice Kennedy and his replacement by a 
jurist whom commentators predict will prove more consistently 
conservative.33  The remaining members of the Roberts Court—who 
constituted the slim majorities that decided the juvenile LWOP cases—
express doubts about the “carceral state”34 at its extremes, but broadly 
accept the core justifications for lengthy imprisonment for ordinary adults.  
Thus, like the carceral conservatives, they broadly accept as constitutional 
the status quo of mass incarceration.  
These observations raise, in turn, a larger question: Where is the 
Constitution in the “carceral state”? Criminal procedure scholars have 
grappled with dimensions of this question, of course, but it invites more 
 
 32 See Sharon Dolovich, Canons of Evasion in Constitutional Criminal Law, in THE NEW CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE THINKING 111, 113 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (characterizing 
the Supreme Court as having “retreat[ed] from the meaningful application of basic constitutional 
values” in the criminal realm). 
 33 See Oliver Roeder & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Conservative Is Brett Kavanaugh?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jul. 17, 2018, 6:54 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-
conservative-is-brett-kavanaugh/ (summarizing several scholars’ empirical predictions that 
“Kavanaugh is likely to be a very conservative justice”).  Of course, Justice Scalia has also been 
replaced since the juvenile LWOP cases were decided, and while most commentators describe his 
replacement, Neil Gorsuch, as similarly conservative, it remains possible that he will rule in 
idiosyncratic ways.  See Mark Joseph Stern, The Gorsuch Brief, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:29 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/nielsen-preap-aclu-neil-gorsuch-briefs.html 
(describing progressive advocates’ view that Gorsuch may be persuadable to rule in their favor on 
textualist grounds). 
 34 For an explanation of the term “carceral state,” see generally Kelly Lytle Hernández, Kahlil 
Gibran Muhammad & Heather Ann Thompson, Introduction: Constructing the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. 
HIST. 18 (2015).  But see Ashley Rubin & Michelle S. Phelps, Fracturing the Penal State: State Actors and 
the Role of Conflict in Penal Change, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 422 (2017) (cautioning against 
unreflective uses of the term to imply a unified entity responsible for punishment). 
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engagement from scholars and teachers of constitutional law more broadly.  
Must and will the “Constitution-in-practice” accommodate mass 
incarceration indefinitely?  As Jack Balkin has shown, each of the successive 
state-building projects of modern United States history—the administrative 
and regulatory state, the welfare state, and the surveillance state—initially 
posed challenges to constitutional culture and the rule of law, though (for 
better or worse) the “Constitution-in-practice” ultimately found ways to 
accommodate each of them.35  What, then, about the “carceral state”—the 
complex of punitive laws, institutions, practices, and norms that developed 
gradually throughout United States history but has accelerated and 
metastasized since the 1970s into a phenomenon without historical or 
comparative parallel?36  Will a similar trajectory also lead (in this case, most 
likely for worse) to permanent constitutional accommodation with this latest 
state-building project?  On the current Court, only Justice Sotomayor has 
forthrightly confronted these questions.  In her dissenting opinion in Utah v. 
Strieff, a Fourth Amendment case, Justice Sotomayor cited several well-
known books about mass incarceration to support her description of how 
“people of color are disproportionate victims” of unconstitutional policing, 
and may feel that they are “not . . . citizen[s] of a democracy but the 
subject[s] of a carceral state.”37  But notably, no other Justice joined that 
section of her dissent. 
Superficially, the carceral state may seem to pose fewer conceptual 
challenges for constitutional culture than the regulatory or welfare states, 
since the Bill of Rights itself provides guidance on questions of bail, 
sentencing, and criminal procedure.  But the Bill of Rights was drafted and 
ratified at a time when prisons were novel and imprisonment was not yet the 
default mode of punishment.38  And many other components of 
constitutional law and culture, beyond just the criminal procedure provisions 
in the Bill of Rights, interlock to make it difficult to challenge mass 
incarceration through litigation: the backdrop assumption of a state “police 
power,” the norm of judicial deference to democratically elected legislatures, 
and the intent requirement for proving racial discrimination.39  It is, 
 
 35 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 25 (2008). 
 36 Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation 
in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 703 (2010). 
 37 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 38  At the founding, fines, whipping, and banishment remained common forms of punishment.  By 
1810, imprisonment in the new state penitentiaries had become more common.  REBECCA M. 
MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941 at 32, 38 (2008).  
 39 On how legislative deference and other doctrinal moves operate as “canons of evasion” enabling 
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therefore, a more difficult question than it may appear whether the 
Constitution is up to the task of confronting an apparatus of internal 
banishment on the scale that the state and federal governments have 
collectively built in recent decades.40  The carceral state is more than the sum 
total of individual criminal prosecutions and something closer to Balkin’s 
conception of the surveillance state, a “way of governing” whose tentacles 
reach into all of the institutions and practices of law and society.41  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to consider every way in which the carceral 
state has been “rationalized and accommodated” by the courts, in ways that 
are likely to continue and in ways that are best described as “constitutional” 
phenomena.42  As Sharon Dolovich sharply observes, “every day, courts 
around the country hear cases with facts that would make a layperson’s jaw 
drop . . . and yet find no constitutional problem.”43  But the juvenile LWOP 
cases present a potent illustration of this larger phenomenon, revealing just 
how much punishment the Court is willing to tolerate, and just how far a 
state has to go before incurring the Court’s intervention.  
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I surveys the methodological 
models and historical context that inform this Article’s reading of the 
juvenile LWOP cases.  Part II performs a close reading of Graham, Miller, 
and Montgomery to develop this Article’s account of the underlying 
commitments that guide the Roberts Court’s approach to punishment 
cases.  Part III briefly suggests some alternative possibilities that might 
emerge if the Court were instead to adopt a “carceral skeptic” lens in 
Eighth Amendment cases, drawing on prison abolitionist thought, 
comparative constitutional law, and originalist scholarship.  This final Part 
is brief because it is intended to spark rather than to settle thought.  It is 
offered in the spirit of imagination.  What might a constitutional law of 
punishment look like that would question rather than accommodate the 
carceral state?  
 
courts to avoid meaningful scrutiny of penal practices, see Dolovich, supra note 32.  For a classic 
analysis of how the intent requirement played out in the realm of drug sentencing, see David A. 
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995).  
 40 For state-specific studies, see, for example, RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: 
PRISONS, SURPLUS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007); MONA LYNCH, 
SUNBELT JUSTICE: ARIZONA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2010).  
 41 Balkin, supra note 35, at 4; cf. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR 
ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007). 
 42 This phrase is borrowed from Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 500–01 
(2006) (describing how the courts “rationalized and accommodated” the growth of the 
administrative and national security states).  
 43 Dolovich, supra note 32, at 140–41. 
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I.  METHODS AND PREMISES 
Constitutional scholars have long recognized that the “Constitution-in-
practice” encompasses more than simply the text—and even, perhaps to the 
consternation of originalists, more than simply the text as interpreted in light 
of its “original meaning”—but also judicially developed “mediating 
principles,” “decision rules,” “tiers of scrutiny,” “frameworks,” and so on.44  
For this reason, “in the day-to-day practice of constitutional 
interpretation . . . the specific words of the text play at most a small role.”45   
Constitutional disputes, certainly in the lower courts but even, in many 
cases, at the Supreme Court, are more commonly “decided by reference to 
‘doctrine’ . . . and to considerations of morality and public policy” than by 
textual analysis alone.46  Some scholars normatively endorse this reality of 
“common law constitutional interpretation,” while others criticize it (or, in 
the case of judges, pretend not to be doing it), but as a descriptive matter, it 
is difficult to gainsay David Strauss’s observation that constitutional 
doctrine, as developed by lawyers and judges over the generations, is what 
gives the Constitution its day-to-day practical meaning.47  “At any point in 
time,” in Jack Balkin’s formulation, “there will be a configuration of 
institutions, conventions, practices, and doctrines whose contours are 
partially disputed,” which together comprise the “constitution-in-practice.”48  
A.  Mediating Principles 
One component of the Constitution-in-practice, especially useful in 
taxonomizing how the Supreme Court interprets open-ended constitutional 
provisions, are what scholars of the Equal Protection Clause have called 
“mediating principles.”  A mediating principle is not an explicitly stated 
doctrinal rule, but “a judicial gloss” that “‘stand[s] between’ the courts and 
the Constitution,” helping to translate broad ideals referenced in the text 
 
 44 See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 1–7 (2004) (summarizing 
scholarship on these “metadoctrinal” features of constitutional law). 
 45 David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1996). 
 46 Id. at 883. 
 47 Id. at 934.  Strauss’s point is readily confirmed by the observation that introductory law school 
courses on constitutional law do not simply assign the text of the Constitution; to understand the 
Constitution as it works in practice, lawyers must be familiar with not only the text, but also the 
body of doctrine that has grown up around it (whether or not they agree with that doctrine or the 
interpretive methods that spawned it). 
 48 Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 242 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn 
eds., 2016) (emphasis omitted). 
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into more detailed real-world meanings.49  It is a mode of interpreting a 
particular constitutional provision “purposively,” in order “to vindicate one 
particular understanding of the concept or value the clause expressly 
guarantees.”50  In a now-familiar distinction, scholarship on the Equal 
Protection Clause has long distinguished between “anti-classification” and 
“anti-subordination” readings of the constitutional equality guarantee.51  
Jurists who understand the clause to instantiate a principle of anti-
classification (or “colorblindness”) read the clause to disfavor policymaking 
that classifies individuals as members of racial groups, regardless of the 
stated reason for the classification.52  This reading best describes the general 
thrust of the case law, particularly in recent years.53  Others, although never 
a majority of the Court, argue instead that the Equal Protection Clause 
instantiates an anti-subordination principle, which permits or, on some 
accounts, even requires policymaking aimed at disrupting entrenched social 
hierarchies by elevating the social standing and material well-being of 
historically subordinated groups.54  From this perspective, racial 
classifications are not necessarily disfavored; policymakers may sometimes 
classify individuals by race if their reason for doing so is to administer 
preferential benefits for historically subordinated groups, but not if their 
reason for doing so is to reinforce traditional hierarchies.55  
Importantly, these types of implicit mediating principles may divide the 
Court even as they remain latent in most cases because they will not 
necessarily generate different outcomes in all applications.56  In Brown v. 
Board of Education,57 the anti-classification and anti-subordination 
approaches would have yielded the same outcome since segregation both 
classified individual students by race and, by relegating African-American 
 
 49 Fiss, supra note 19, at 107–08. 
 50 Siegel, supra note 19, at 1282 n.8. 
 51 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause, 58 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 35, 35 (2003). 
 52 Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over 
Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1470 (2004) (describing the view that Brown “declare[ed] the 
constitutional principle that government may not classify on the basis of race”).  The anti-
classification principle, as elaborated by Siegel, corresponds to what Fiss originally called “the 
antidiscrimination principle.”  See Fiss, supra note 19, at 108. 
 53 Siegel, supra note 52, at 1473. 
 54 Id. at 1472–73 (defining the “antisubordination principle” as the “conviction that it is wrong for the 
state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of historically oppressed groups”). 
 55 Fiss, supra note 19, at 153–54. 
 56 See id. at 170 (“In many situations it will not make a great deal of difference whether the Court 
operates under the antidiscrimination principle or the group-disadvantaging one.”).  
 57 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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children to separate and inferior schools, reinforced a racial hierarchy that 
had both social and economic implications.58  It was only the subsequent 
decades of contestation over the continuing legacy of Brown that exposed 
the divide between the two views, most bitterly in the affirmative action 
cases, in which the principles pointed to opposite outcomes.59  Preferential 
treatment for historically disadvantaged groups appears wholly illegitimate 
on a strong anti-classification view that regards all racial categorization as 
equally odious, but perfectly legitimate or even required on a strong anti-
subordination view.60  
Reva Siegel has surfaced in the Court’s more recent jurisprudence a 
third principle at work, the “anti-balkanization” norm.61  Particularly 
evident in the opinions of “swing justices” Kennedy and O’Connor in 
affirmative action cases, the anti-balkanization reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause occupies a middle ground between the individualistic, 
conservative formalism of the anti-classification principle and the group-
based, redistributive vision of the anti-subordination principle.62  In Justice 
Kennedy’s view, as elucidated by Siegel, the Equal Protection Clause 
should be read with the purpose in mind of minimizing balkanizing social 
divisions.63  Policymaking that takes account of race or other group 
categories is permissible in the service of bridging social divides, including 
those that derive from the continuing legacy of segregation.  But race-based 
policymaking is impermissible if the categories are too crudely defined, or if 
they are used in ways that are likely to foment resentment and encourage 
people to identify themselves primarily as part of subgroups rather than as 
part of a larger society.64  
It may seem as though this approach is inapposite to the Eighth 
Amendment.  In contrast to equal protection scholarship, much of which 
has focused on distilling and evaluating the “mediating principles” at work 
 
 58 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 170–71. 
 59 See id. at 171–72; see also Siegel, supra note 52, at 1470. 
 60 See Fiss, supra note 19, at 155, 171–72.  Interestingly, Fiss’s suggestion that courts might offer 
“time-bound” approval for preferential programs for minorities anticipated Justice O’Connor’s 
suggestion in the affirmative action cases that after 25 years they may no longer be constitutional 
(which is not to say that Justice O’Connor engaged in anti-subordination readings of the Equal 
Protection Clause).  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.”) 
 61 See generally Siegel, supra note 19. 
 62 See id. at 1300–02 (describing how the anti-balkanization view combines premises from both the 
anti-classification and anti-subordination views). 
 63 See id. at 1305–08. 
 64 See id. at 1300–03.  
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in the jurisprudence, scholars often characterize Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence as untethered to any coherent principles.65  For example, 
Erwin Chemerinsky describes the constitutional law of punishment as 
“markedly inconsistent both in terms of substantive limits and procedural 
requirements.”66  Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has characterized its 
punishment jurisprudence as lacking “a unifying principle.”67  In this 
standard account, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence represents 
“a paradigm of improper judicial legislation.”68  Lacking any guiding 
principles, the Justices are instead thought to indulge in Eighth Amendment 
cases in independent moral and policy judgments, free-floating from any 
conception of the constitutional text or the larger commitments that it 
embodies.  In Justice Scalia’s withering assessment, Eighth Amendment 
doctrine shifts with the winds, guided by no principle but the Justices’ own 
idiosyncratic assessments of societal “evolution.”69  In Justice Alito’s view, 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has degenerated ever closer to 
representing simply “the personal views of five Justices.”70  
On the surface, proportionality offers the closest thing to a guiding 
principle in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.71  Members of the Court 
 
 65 E.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 67, 70 (arguing that Eighth Amendment case law lacks “a set of 
broader guiding principles delineating the boundary between acceptable and impermissible 
punishments.”); Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 
858 (2013) (describing Eighth Amendment doctrine as “notoriously unclear and inconsistent”); 
Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005) 
(describing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “ineffectual and incoherent”); Mary Sigler, The 
Political Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403, 429 (2011) (characterizing 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as inviting “confusion and cynicism”); id. at 415 (arguing that 
Eighth Amendment case law “lacks political legitimacy” because the Court typically “fails to 
specify the actual grounds of decision,” opening itself up to the criticism that it is simply imposing 
policy preferences); Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 475, 476 (2005) (characterizing Eighth Amendment case law as a “mess”).  Such complaints 
have a long lineage; for an earlier example, see Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited 
Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 838 (1972) (characterizing 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as an “analytical void”). 
 66 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2004).  
 67 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436–37 (2008). 
 68 Stinneford, supra note 15, at 438; see id. at 442 (suggesting that the Court’s cases reflect the 
Justices’ “substantive policy judgment . . . rather than the judgment embodied in the Constitution 
itself”); see also Sigler, supra note 65, at 405 & n.16 (collecting sources attributing the Court’s 
decisions to the Justices’ “personal policy preferences” or rough assessments of public opinion). 
 69 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737, 742 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 509–10 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing earlier 
cases as insisting otherwise, but implying that the Court no longer makes the effort); see also id. at 
514 (describing post-Miller case law as “no longer tied to any objective indicia of society’s 
standards” and “entirely inward looking”). 
 71 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3104 (2015) 
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periodically insist that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
embodies a “proportionality principle,” albeit a “narrow” one.72  Yet, as 
many scholars have noted, the Court has vacillated in its willingness to 
enforce any meaningful proportionality requirement for criminal 
sentencing, particularly outside of the death penalty context.73  Since 1983, 
the Court has not invalidated a single adult prison sentence as 
disproportionate.74  Instead, in virtually every major modern case 
presenting a plausible proportionality challenge, the Court has upheld an 
extremely long prison term for a crime of debatable severity.  For instance, 
in Ewing v. California, the Court affirmed a prison term of twenty-five years 
to life (pursuant to California’s since-revised Three Strikes Law) for the 
theft of three golf clubs.75  It is difficult to imagine what, if any, sentence 
that any modern state would actually impose would run afoul of such a 
meager proportionality principle.  In these cases, the Court always purports 
to leave open the possibility that a punishment might be held 
unconstitutionally disproportionate, yet it also always emphasizes that such 
cases will be “exceedingly rare.”  By way of example, the Court has 
suggested that it might be unconstitutional “if a legislature made overtime 
 
(observing that Eighth Amendment case law prohibits “punishments grossly disproportionate to 
the severity of the offense”). 
 72 E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Contra Miller, 
567 U.S. 460, 501–04 (2012) (Thomas, J.) (stating that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause “does not contain a ‘proportionality principle.’”); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985 (Scalia, J.) 
(disputing that grossly disproportionate sentences are unconstitutional).  
 73 Jackson, supra note 71, at 3104 (noting that “the Court’s willingness actually to scrutinize the 
proportionality of sentences has varied over time and contexts”); Tonja Jacobi & Ross Berlin, 
Supreme Irrelevance: The Court’s Abdication in Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
2033, 2087–88 (2018) (summarizing the Court’s “startlingly uneven” proportionality 
jurisprudence). 
 74 Jackson, supra note 71, at 3104 n.44; see also id. at 3185–86 (noting that “the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment case law on non-capital sentences for adult offenders is sparse” and “for non-death 
sentences of imprisonment the standard of ‘gross disproportionality’ will rarely be met”); 
Stinneford, supra note 15, at 484 (characterizing protections against excessive sentencing as 
“meaningless” after Harmelin and Ewing).  In Solem v. Helm, the Court invalidated an LWOP 
sentence, pursuant to a South Dakota recidivist statute, for “uttering a ‘no account’ check for 
$100.”  463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983).  Subsequently, the Court has taken great pains to limit Solem to 
its facts and Justices Scalia and Thomas argued against giving Solem any stare decisis effect.  See 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Scalia's 
view that the proportionality test announced in Solem v. Helm is incapable of judicial application.”) 
(internal citation omitted) (citing Solem, 463 U.S. 277). 
 75 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14, 18; see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372–75 (1982) (per curiam) 
(upholding forty-year prison sentence for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of 
marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264–66 (1980) (upholding life sentence under a 
Texas three strikes provision for “felony theft”—specifically, for refusing to return $120 received 
as payment for air conditioner repairs that were allegedly not performed).  
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parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.”76  In effect, then, the 
Court has defined the proportionality principle so minimally that it is “has 
no meaning” in practice.77 
Because the Justices do not even seem to adhere consistently to their 
own explicitly stated overarching principles in Eighth Amendment cases, 
the resultant body of doctrine appears multimodal.  In John Stinneford’s 
analysis, the Court does not apply a single decision rule in Eighth 
Amendment cases, but rather toggles between two opposite rules: first, “an 
apparently irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality” in cases involving 
“imprisonment of adults,” and second, “an apparently irrebuttable 
presumption of unconstitutional excessiveness” in certain exceptional 
categories such as the death penalty for non-homicide offenses and juvenile 
LWOP.78  Yet Stinneford does not suggest that either of these rules has any 
principled basis. Rather, he argues that the Court has come to rely on these 
“implementation rules” because it has neglected to interpret the meaning of 
the constitutional text.79  As a result of this apparent doctrinal incoherency, 
scholarship on the Eighth Amendment often takes the form of proposing 
unifying principles that the Court should adopt, proceeding from the 
premise that the Court’s output thus far has been analytically and 
philosophically muddled.80  
 
 76 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11). 
 77 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Chemerinsky, supra 
note 66, at 1049–50 (predicting that like Ewing, Andrade would make it “very difficult, if not 
impossible, for courts to find any prison sentence to be grossly disproportionate”); Dolovich, supra 
note 32, at 128 (arguing that the Court’s cases post-Solem have upheld such draconian sentences 
that the case law creates a “presumption by extreme example,” signaling to lower courts that they 
should “uphold as constitutional virtually any sentence” (emphasis omitted)).  Although such 
characterizations are most typically offered of the Court’s sentencing jurisprudence, there are also 
arguments that the Court has similarly rendered meaningless the Clause’s protections against 
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.  See id. at 131–32 (arguing that courts incorrectly deny 
the majority of prisoners’ constitutional claims because they exploit doctrinal pathways to evade 
“look[ing] too closely at the actual lived experiences” of prisoners); Margo Schlanger, The 
Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 360 (2018) (arguing that 
the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in conditions-of-confinement cases “has 
radically undermined prison officials’ accountability for tragedies behind bars”). 
 78 Stinneford, supra note 15, at 442–43. 
 79 Id. 
 80 John Stinneford argues that the Court has developed “implementation rules” in the Eighth 
Amendment context, but he views these rules as illegitimate because they are not grounded in a 
properly originalist interpretation of the text.  Id. at 440–43.  Another possible unifying principle 
might be the notion of progress embodied in the “evolving standards of decency” paradigm.  
Mary Sigler proposes that the Court’s “evolving standards” jurisprudence is incoherent and 
overly deferential to legislative majorities as applied, but nevertheless worth retaining.  Sigler, 
supra note 65, at 429. 
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This Article takes a different tack, using the juvenile LWOP cases to 
suggest that it may be possible to distill certain coherent purposive 
commitments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, roughly analogous to 
the “mediating principles” familiar from equal protection scholarship.  This 
Article does not endeavor to develop a comprehensive account of 
mediating principles across all of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence or even 
necessarily to argue that there are mediating principles in precisely the 
same sense that scholars use the term in the equal protection literature.  
Rather, the mediating principles literature provides a helpful 
methodological model, suggesting a way of reading backwards from the 
judicial rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases to identify implicit principles 
and “model division” on the Court about questions of criminal justice more 
generally.81  This Article does not offer a normative endorsement of any of 
the principles identified (actually the opposite), nor make any claims about 
whether the Justices (or some subset of the Justices) are “correctly” 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment, under an originalist or any other 
theory of interpretation.82  The project of this Article is mostly descriptive: 
to distill from the case law some clues as to the premises and assumptions at 
work in the Court’s recent punishment jurisprudence.  
 
 
 81 Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 1281–82. 
 82 There is an extensive debate in the literature about originalism and the Eighth Amendment.  See 
generally Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment’s Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Century, 106 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405 (2017) (exploring the context of penal reform in post-
Revolution America and how the founding generation sought to distinguish American criminal 
law from practices in European monarchies); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969) (arguing that the 
American framers misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights when crafting the Eighth 
Amendment); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Harmelin’s Faulty Originalism, 14 NEV. L.J. 522 
(2014) (providing a “point-by-point” originalist critique of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)); Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth 
Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and “Cruel and Unusual” Punishment, 94 N.C. L. REV. 817, 817 (2016) 
(placing the language of the Eighth Amendment in the context of early-American notions on the 
“permissible limits on the treatment of slaves”); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment 
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
567 (2010) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment bars only punishments that are both cruel 
and unusual); Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 81 (2010) (emphasizing 
that “the nature and quality of punishment are central to the concept of cruelty”); John F. 
Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 441 (2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, 
Cruel] (arguing that the primary purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is to 
“prevent unjust suffering, not the coarsening of public sensibilities”); John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Unusual] (examining the similarities and differences between 
the originalist and “evolving standards” interpretations of the word “unusual”).  
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Generally, equal protection scholars identify mediating principles by 
engaging in close reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions themselves, as 
well as constitutional commentary, and seeking to backwards-engineer from 
those sources the superstructure of premises and assumptions that appear to 
be driving the Justices to their patterns of reasoning and outcomes in 
particular cases.  Reva Siegel, for example, models in her work a method of 
closely reading “recent decisions” and “[a]bstracting from the complex 
logic of the case law unfolding in history” in order to “model division on 
the Court.”83  This approach does not simply take the Justices at their 
word, but it does start from their words and work from there.  
Methodologically, this Article takes cues from this approach of closely 
reading and abstracting from the internal logic of recent Supreme Court 
decisions.  This Article therefore does not engage in extensive discussion of 
the underlying litigation in the lower courts, the advocates and 
organizations involved, and their own choices about how to frame the 
issues, although such a project would surely also illuminate much about the 
developing trajectory of Eighth Amendment law.  Nor does this Article 
delve into the growing body of case law applying Graham, Miller, and 
Montgomery in the state courts and lower federal courts to new fact patterns.  
Rather, this Article’s focus remains upon the Supreme Court. 
B.  Historical Context  
In conducting its close reading of the Supreme Court’s juvenile LWOP 
opinions, this Article proceeds from the assumption that the Justices are 
influenced by cultural and political discourses of the society of which they 
are a part, and therefore that historical scholarship on how that society has 
developed over time may help to illuminate the discursive constructs at 
work in the Justices’ reasoning.84  
 
 83 Siegel, supra note 19, at 1281–82. 
 84 See G. Edward White, Toward a Historical Understanding of Supreme Court Decision-making, 91 DENVER 
U. L. REV. ONLINE 201, 202–03 (2014) (discussing how Supreme Court Justices are “historical 
actors whose decisions [are] shaped by the cultural boundaries on thought and discourse of their 
time,” and noting that historians are well suited to “document” those cultural influences).  See 
generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (emphasizing the importance of historical 
context in understanding Supreme Court decision-making).  However, White suggests that this 
kind of historical approach will typically be less helpful for understanding very recent Supreme 
Court decisions, because “we are too close to those events and attitudes” to recognize the deep 
assumptions of our cultural moment that both we and the justices may share.  White, supra, at 
203–04, 203 n.8.  While acknowledging the need for humility in analyzing recent events that 
future historians may come to understand differently, this Article proceeds from the assumption 
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Two bodies of historical scholarship offer essential context for 
understanding the juvenile LWOP cases.  The first is the history of 
childhood and youth.  This Article reads the Justices’ rhetoric in the light of 
historical scholarship on the intellectual, cultural, and political development 
of concepts central to the Court’s reasoning—such as the construct of 
“adolescence” as a liminal phase in the life course.  Much of the scholarly 
discussion about the juvenile LWOP cases has proceeded within the 
framework of positivist science, assuming that there are certain essential, 
biological differences that “actually” distinguish children from adults and 
then debating the extent to which such differences should inform the 
constitutional law of punishment.85  Without disputing that physiological 
development occurs during the human life span, this Article reads the 
Court’s rhetoric instead within the context of the history of childhood and 
youth, a mode of historical scholarship that investigates how understandings 
of that developmental process are socially constructed and have changed 
over time, along with beliefs about the legal or institutional significance that 
should attach to categories like “childhood” or “adolescence.”86  
The second indispensable historical context for reading the juvenile 
LWOP cases is the unprecedented buildup of the “carceral state” in the late 
twentieth-century United States.87  After the 1960s, the United States 
embarked upon, and continues to engage in, a constellation of carceral 
practices “defined by comparatively and historically extreme rates of 
imprisonment and by the concentration of imprisonment among young, 
 
that historical context can be used to deepen our understanding even of relatively recent Supreme 
Court decisions.  
 85 For a notable exception, see generally Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and the Common Law Infancy 
Defense, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1577 (2018) (engaging with the history of the cultural construction of 
“adolescence”).  Also, beyond the recent LWOP cases, scholarship on juvenile justice broadly 
speaking has long incorporated the insights of the history of childhood and youth.  See, e.g., BARRY 
C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 17–45 (1999) 
(providing an overview of the history of “the social construction of childhood and adolescence”). 
 86 The history of childhood and youth is a subdiscipline of history with a wide and variegated 
literature, to which I do not attempt to cite comprehensively in this Article.  For a classic (and 
much-debated) text in the field, see PHILIPPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (Robert Baldick trans., Vintage Books 1962) (1960) (exploring the 
concept of childhood as a construct, arguing that children were once seen merely as “small 
adults” but over time came to be viewed as occupying a distinctive life stage).  For recent 
scholarship touching specifically upon the legal dimensions of the history of childhood and youth, 
see, for example, HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, & THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005) (chronicling how changing understandings of 
political consent reshaped the legal status of children). 
 87 See Thompson, supra note 36, at 706 (detailing the twentieth-century American history of mass 
incarceration). 
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African American men living in neighborhoods of concentrated 
disadvantage.”88  After fifty years of escalating and expanding use of 
imprisonment, the United States is now “the world’s leading jailer.”89  
Activists and scholars debate whether to label this phenomenon “mass 
incarceration,” “hyperincarceration,” “the new Jim Crow,” or “the prison-
industrial complex,” but the phenomenon itself is now widely appreciated.90  
Together the federal and state governments incarcerate 693 of every 
100,000 residents, for a total of more than two million prisoners—a rate 
and a total that are both much higher than the comparable figures in any 
peer country in the world and much higher than the United States’ own 
historic levels before the “punitive turn” in United States social policy 
beginning in the 1970s. ⁠91   
Not only does the United States have an incarceration rate “more than 
five times higher” than most of its peers, but this same characterization 
holds at the state level—there is no United States state that is not extremely 
punitive.92  It is true that the Southern and Western states are even more 
extremely punitive than the United States norm, but the United States 
norm is itself quite extreme, and even purportedly lenient or progressive 
states by United States standards appear quite regressive in world 
comparison.  Massachusetts, for example, the United States’ state with the 
 
 88 Christopher Wildeman, Mass Incarceration, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES: CRIMINOLOGY, 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/abstract/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-
9780195396607-0033.xml?rskey=F2p5o1&result=103 (last modified Apr. 24, 2012).  On the 
harms wrought by mass incarceration upon African-American communities in particular, see 
generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American 
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).  
 89 Katherine Beckett, Mass Incarceration and Its Discontents, 47 CONTEMP. SOC. 11, 11 (2017). 
 90 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that discrimination based on criminal status is a colorblind 
form of racial discrimination); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the 
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012) (critiquing the Jim Crow analogy as having a negative 
effect on collective memory); Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race, & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 
DŒDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74 (labeling the phenomenon “hyperincarceration”); Robert 
Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration, DŒDALUS, 
Summer 2010, at 124 (arguing that the phrase “mass incarceration” is “melodramatic”); Timothy 
Shenk, The Origins of the Carceral State, DISSENT: BOOKED (Aug. 30, 2016), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/booked-origins-carceral-state-elizabeth-hinton 
(discussing the “carceral state”  in an interview with Harvard Associate Professor of History and 
of African and African American Studies Elizabeth Hinton). 
 91 Press Release, Peter Wagner & Alison Walsh, Prison Policy Initiative, States of Incarceration: The 
Global Context 2016 (June 16, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2016.html.  For a 
range of perspectives on this phenomenon, see generally the essays collected in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Kevin R. Reitz ed., 2018). 
 92 Press Release, supra note 91. 
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lowest incarceration rate, nevertheless has an incarceration rate higher than 
every European and South American country, and lower only than 
Turkmenistan, El Salvador, Cuba, Thailand, Russia, Rwanda, Panama, 
and Costa Rica.⁠93  Draconian sentencing laws and practices like LWOP, 
while not the sole factor, are a linchpin of mass incarceration: “people 
convicted of felonies in the United States are far more likely to be sentenced 
to confinement than is the case in other countries and . . . U.S. prison 
sentences are extraordinarily long compared to those imposed in other 
democracies.”94  Comparing United States sentencing practices to those in 
other countries that make much more judicious use of prison, Michael 
Tonry concludes: “No meaningful progress will be made in reducing mass 
incarceration . . . until sentencing laws and practices are overhauled.”95  
The insight that the contemporary United States is exceptionally 
punitive is, of course, far from novel.  Activists, especially women of color 
with loved ones affected by abusive policing and prolonged prison terms, 
have made this point for decades.96  Sociologists and political scientists have 
long sought to make sense of the American phenomenon of “mass 
imprisonment.”97  Legal scholars have provided wide-ranging explorations 
of the historical, cultural, doctrinal, and philosophical underpinnings of 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Beckett, supra note 89, at 14 (summarizing MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL 
REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2025 (2016)). 
 95 TONRY, supra note 88, at 2. 
 96 See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 40, at 5–29 (describing 1990s activism by women with loved ones in 
the California prison system).  
 97 MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001).  For 
other examples, see, KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3–8 (1997) (challenging the view that mass imprisonment 
was a straightforward and inevitable response to public concerns about rising crime, and instead 
describing a more complex process in which political elites took the lead in framing crime as “the 
consequence of insufficient punishment”); TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE 
PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 16 
(2014) (conceptualizing mass incarceration as the result of a “grand social experiment” in 
replacing rehabilitative policies with severe punishment); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE 
PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2 (2015) (describing how the 
carceral state has “begun to metastasize” and distort a wide range of public programs and 
institutions); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON 
AMERICA 10 (2014) (arguing that both conservative and liberal politicians advanced 
“constructions of black criminality” to justify the widening resort to imprisonment); JEREMY 
TRAVIS ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 24 (2014) (exploring policies that have contributed to the rise in 
mass incarceration); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 4–5 (2006) 
(arguing that “the prison boom was a political project that arose partly because of rising crime but 
also in response to an upheaval in American race relations in the 1960s and the collapse of urban 
labor markets for unskilled men in the 1970s,” and has had counterproductive consequences).  
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America’s “harsh justice,” particularly the tendency instantiated in very 
lengthy prison terms to write people off as irredeemable,98 and 
demonstrated how, across a range of doctrinal contexts, the Supreme Court 
has largely failed to regulate the machinery of the “carceral state,” tinkering 
with its excesses only at the extremes.99   As Sharon Dolovich observes, 
“judicial oversight and review are supposed to discipline . . . the state’s 
exercise of its penal power” in theory, and yet in practice American courts 
“largely affirm the outputs of our plainly compromised criminal system.”100 
At this point, then, American judicial rhetoric about punishment cannot 
be read independently of this now widely recognized historical 
phenomenon.  When the Justices write about punishment, the positions 
they take and the words they use must be lined up against this backdrop 
reality: the United States is extraordinarily punitive, its dominant form of 
punishment is imprisonment, and legislative sentencing choices over the 
past forty or fifty years have played a large part in constructing this reality.  
Therefore, whenever the Justices debate the merits of deferring to the 
legislature to make sentencing decisions, they are not debating the merits of 
deferring to legislative choices in the abstract.  What they are debating, in 
real-world terms, are the merits of deferring to legislative choices to build 
and maintain mass incarceration.  (Almost by definition, cases reflecting the 
opposite legislative choice—which is to say, cases in which individuals are 
not sent to prison, or are released from prison—are less likely to generate 
Eighth Amendment complaints, but in any event it is only very recently 
that states have begun to experiment with meaningful reforms to the status 
quo.)  And by focusing on the juvenile LWOP cases, this Article seeks to 
draw attention to how thoroughly the American predilection for harsh 
punishment has permeated the Supreme Court—seeping through the 
Justices’ rhetoric even in those opinions that may seem on the surface to 





 98 See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 
(2014); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPE (2003); Kleinfeld, supra note 18. 
 99 See generally Jacobi & Ross, supra note 73. 
 100 Dolovich, supra note 32, at 111.  
Dec. 2018] YOUTH AND PUNISHMENT AT THE ROBERTS COURT 565 
   
 
II.  READING THE CASES  
Informed by the methods and historical context discussed above, this 
Part provides a close reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Graham, 
Miller, and Montgomery—reading them not only with the grain to determine 
their holdings and doctrinal significance, but also against the grain, and as 
historical artifacts, in order to surface the deeper assumptions about 
punishment lurking within them.  Some scholars have expressed cautious 
hope that the holdings of the juvenile LWOP cases might be extended to 
support more rigorous constitutional review of adult sentencing,101 or even 
open the door toward judicial intervention in the crisis of mass 
incarceration.102  Yet as elaborated in the remainder of this Part, these cases 
may prove more limited than they appear. 
A.  Carceral Conservatism 
This Part’s analysis begins with the conservative dissenting opinions in 
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, for two reasons.  First, as a matter of crude 
vote-counting, Justice Kennedy, the swing vote in Miller and Montgomery, has 
now retired.  While it remains to be seen how Justice Kennedy’s 
replacement will remake the Court’s jurisprudence in the long run (and, for 
that matter, whether or how Scalia’s replacement will alter the balance on 
the Court), it seems likely that the future Court will trend in a more 
conservative direction on criminal justice issues.103  And thus, 
understanding the assumptions and premises of the conservative wing of the 
Court may be most relevant to predicting the near-term trajectory of the 
case law, even though this wing did not control the outcomes of the juvenile 
 
 101 E.g., Jackson, supra note 71, at 3188 & n.438 (describing it as “uncertain” whether Graham and 
Miller “foreshadow a broader willingness to take a harder look at the constitutional proportionality 
of noncapital sentences,” including “prison sentences for adults”).  For an argument that Miller 
should be extended to require individualized sentencing for any LWOP sentence or term-of-years 
sentence that is effectively a life sentence, see generally William W. Berry III, The Mandate of 
Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327, 327–30 (2014).  See also Berry, supra note 28, at 83–85 (arguing 
for more Eighth Amendment scrutiny of adult LWOP). 
 102 E.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 102 (characterizing Miller as a possible “baby step” toward “ending 
mass incarceration”); Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 415–19 (suggesting that Graham and 
other cases reflect an incremental but decided shift in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence “toward 
a fundamentally robust protection” for “the liberty interests of criminal defendants,” in which the 
Court plays a more active role “as an independent arbiter of excessive punishment”). 
 103 See Daniel Epps, Criminal Procedure in Winter, 51 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204125 (predicting that Trump’s election 
makes it “unlikely” that the Supreme Court will in the near future extend criminal procedure 
doctrine in the ways hoped for by criminal justice reformers). 
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LWOP cases.  Second and more substantively, this Article’s overall account 
will likely make more sense if the conservative wing of the Court is analyzed 
first, because the conservative Justices have a less internally conflicted 
position about questions of punishment.  They begin from a relatively 
straightforward view that punishment generally, and imprisonment more 
specifically, is a positive good, and therefore should be subject to only 
minimal constitutional limits.  For the most part, the “swing” and liberal 
Justices seem to share this view as a default, as applied to what might be 
called ordinary adult punishment; it is only in cases presenting exceptional 
circumstances, like the juvenile LWOP cases, that they modestly depart 
from it.  
This bloc of the Court, consistently including Justices Thomas and Alito 
(as well as the departed Scalia), and sometimes including Chief Justice 
Roberts, appears animated in Eighth Amendment cases by a vision of 
punishment that might be called “carceral conservatism.”104  They have 
developed a genre of opinion that blends deterrent and incapacitative 
philosophies of punishment with lurid imagery borrowed from the “tough-
on-crime” politicking of the past fifty years to depict imprisonment as 
generally a positive good.  When used on the right people (i.e., people who 
have revealed themselves as essentially “criminal”), it yields benefits for 
society.  Thus, the Eighth Amendment should be read with the purpose in 
mind of facilitating punishment, minimizing judicial interference not only 
with state decisions to imprison people in the first instance but also with 
state decisions to keep people in prison who are already there.  In the words 
of Justice Alito, the fact that the Eighth Amendment constrains judges from 
interfering with very long prison terms is not a regrettable feature of the 
Constitution that his judicial role consigns him to live with.  It is, rather, a 
virtue of the Constitution that should be celebrated: it is “with good reason” 
that “[t]he Eighth Amendment . . . for the most part . . . leaves questions of 
sentencing policy” to the legislature.105 
 
 
 104 This term may be analogized to “carceral feminism,” a term sometimes used to denote versions of 
feminist politics that endorse incarceration as a solution to gender-based violence.  E.g., Alex 
Press, #MeToo Must Avoid “Carceral Feminism,” VOX (Feb. 1, 2018, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/2/1/16952744/me-too-larry-nassar-judge-aquilina-
feminism (presenting several reasons why police and prisons are ill-equipped to prevent sexual 
violence and instead advocating for distributive economic justice for women); see also Aya Gruber, 
Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 581 (2009) (criticizing the alliance 
between some versions of feminism and the politics of crime control).  
 105 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
Dec. 2018] YOUTH AND PUNISHMENT AT THE ROBERTS COURT 567 
   
 
In the juvenile LWOP cases, the carceral conservative perspective 
emerges most clearly in the dissenting opinions of Justice Alito.  In Graham, 
Justice Alito filed a separate, short dissent designed specifically to reassure 
states that they still retained the authority to impose very long prison 
sentences on juveniles.  The Graham majority opinion, in Justice Alito’s 
reading, does not, in any way, alter a state’s authority to impose “a sentence 
to a term of years without the possibility of parole.”106  Justice Alito’s 
Graham dissent also quotes and highlights a concession made by the 
petitioner at oral argument “that a sentence of as much as 40 years without 
the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.”107  The 
underlying premise at work here is not only pro-prison but essentially pro-
punishment.  For Justice Alito, punishment in the service of protecting 
public safety is a core function of states and a function with which the 
federal courts interfere at their peril—or rather, at the peril of the people.  
Thus, Justice Alito seeks to provide states with a road map for how to 
minimize the interference caused by the Graham majority opinion. 
For those Justices who begin from the premise that the continued 
imprisonment of convicted criminals is generally beneficial, it is prudent to 
avoid readings of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that might 
lead, even indirectly, to releasing people from prison.  It is partly for this 
reason that the Montgomery dissenters disagreed with the holding that the 
new rules of juvenile LWOP must be applied retroactively, to people like 
Henry Montgomery.  The Montgomery majority, Justice Thomas complains 
in his dissent, reads the Eighth Amendment in such a way that it would 
prevent state courts “from insisting that prisoners remain in prison when 
their convictions or sentences are later deemed unconstitutional.”108  This 
phrasing is telling.  To appreciate its import, it is helpful to re-read the 
sentence in more truncated form.  The crux of Justice Thomas’s concern is 
that the Montgomery majority has disturbed the status quo in which 
“prisoners remain in prison.”  The fact that these prisoners may have been 
convicted or sentenced in violation of what (some) jurists would now 
consider constitutional requirements is not a reason to let them out of 
prison.  The key fact about people like Henry Montgomery is that they are 




 106 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 749 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Though readily apparent in the juvenile LWOP cases, carceral 
conservatism can also be traced in the Roberts Court’s Eighth Amendment 
conditions-of-confinement cases.  Consider, for example, the dissenting 
opinions of Justices Alito and Scalia in Brown v. Plata, the 2011 California 
prison overcrowding case.109  Plata upheld a lower court’s order—based on 
hundreds of pages of factual findings and issued only after nineteen years of 
litigation—designed to remedy the uncontested finding that California’s 
extremely overcrowded prisons constituted an Eighth Amendment 
violation, because the overcrowding made it impossible to provide prisoners 
with minimally adequate healthcare.  At the height of the crisis, it was “an 
uncontested fact” that a prisoner was dying needlessly in the California 
prison system every seven days.110  The lower court issued what is 
statutorily termed a “prisoner release order,” but the order did not actually 
require California to release prisoners “in an indiscriminate manner,” nor 
necessarily to release current prisoners outright.  Rather, it mandated a 
gradual reduction of the prison population to more manageable levels, 
which could be achieved through prospective sentencing and policy reforms 
to reduce the future inflow of new prisoners and thereby bring down the 
prison population over time.111  
In Justice Alito’s view, the Plata majority dramatically overstepped the 
judicial role in approving such an order.  Notably, Justice Alito’s Plata 
dissent begins by emphasizing the power of states to punish: “The 
Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal 
systems.  Decisions regarding state prisons have profound public safety and 
financial implications, and the States are generally free to make these 
decisions as they choose.”112  The dissent then characterizes the Eighth 
Amendment as imposing “an important—but limited—restraint” on 
punishment.113  States, Justice Alito emphasizes, may punish “as they 
choose”—subject only to the very minor caveat that they cannot “depriv[e] 
inmates of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’”114  Justice 
Alito goes on to predict that “grim” results will follow from the majority’s 
 
 109 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 550 (2011) (Scalia, J. dissenting); id. at 565 (Alito, J. dissenting).  
 110 Id. at 507–08 (quoting lower court findings of fact). 
 111 See id. at 501 (summarizing the lower court order requiring California to reduce the prison 
population to 137.5% of design capacity, and noting that “the reduction need not be 
accomplished in an indiscriminate manner” but could be achieved through future changes such as 
“diversion of low-risk offenders and technical parole violators to community-based programs”). 
 112 Id. at 565 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 113 Id. (emphasis added). 
 114 Id. at 565 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).  
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holding.115  Misrepresenting the effect of the order under review (which, 
again, did not require immediate or indiscriminate release of large numbers 
of prisoners at once, but could be satisfied gradually through prospective 
policy changes), and making a bizarre military comparison, Justice Alito 
accuses the court below of “order[ing] the premature release of 
approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions” (the 
italics are Justice Alito’s).116  The majority, in Justice Alito’s view, is 
“gambling with the safety of the people of California” and its disregard of 
public safety will likely generate “a grim roster of victims.”117  The implicit 
premise of Justice Alito’s dissent, then, is that mass imprisonment promotes 
public safety.  Therefore, any interference with a state’s institutions of mass 
imprisonment poses a risk to public safety.  Formally, Justice Alito pegs his 
analysis to questions of statutory interpretation and disputes with the 
district court’s factual findings, but the emotion bubbling through his 
rhetoric makes clear that he is not merely quibbling about statutory text or 
findings of fact.118  
Justice Scalia’s Plata dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, offers another 
illustration of carceral conservatism.  Scalia begins by decrying the lower 
court order as “perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our 
Nation’s history,” and the Supreme Court’s majority opinion affirming that 
order as “outrageous” and “absurd,” a total abrogation of the “power of a 
federal judge” that “takes the federal courts wildly beyond their institutional 
capacity.”119  But the remainder of the opinion expresses more visceral 
worries than simply an abstract view about the institutional division of 
labor.  The remainder of Justice Scalia’s Plata dissent is replete with 
gratuitous asides betraying a generalized fear of “prisoners,” reflecting the 
carceral conservative assumption that imprisoning the dangerous is a 
positive good, and thus a practice with which the Eighth Amendment 
should not be read to interfere.  At one point, Justice Scalia predicts that 
the order will return to California’s streets “fine physical specimens who 
 
 115 Id. at 581. 
 116 Id. at 566. 
 117 Id. at 580–81. 
 118 Justice Alito’s prediction of “grim” results echoed Justice Blackmun’s dissent many years earlier in 
the Pentagon Papers Case, which raised the specter of dead soldiers.  Id. at 581; N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States (Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713, 762–63 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In 
both cases, it is perhaps worth noting that the predicted effects do not seem to have occurred, but 
the Justices’ point in both cases that the majority had intolerably increased the risk that such 
effects might occur is not readily susceptible to empirical disproof. 
 119 Plata, 563 U.S. at 550 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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have developed intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”120  
In addition to the dehumanizing language, this line also betrays Justice 
Scalia’s inattention to the factual record in the very case he was deciding.  
California’s prisons had long been so overcrowded that they no longer had 
gyms.  The gyms had been converted to makeshift dormitories, and were 
filled with triple bunk beds.121  
Between Justice Scalia’s conjuring of “fine physical specimens” with 
“intimidating muscles” roaming the streets and Justice Alito’s specter of 
“Army divisions” committing coordinated mayhem throughout California, 
the clear message of the Plata dissents is that some people are irreparably 
and inherently dangerous, prison is the place for them, and the courts 
under the guise of the Eighth Amendment ought not interfere with their 
continued confinement.  The carceral conservative Justices’ juvenile LWOP 
opinions are similarly replete with essentializing and descriptors of the 
individuals involved.  Justice Scalia’s Montgomery dissent repeatedly positions 
Montgomery’s location in prison as essential to his identity as a person, 
denominating Montgomery as “a 69-year-old Louisiana prisoner” and an 
“inmate.”122  Elsewhere Scalia refers to Montgomery as “a 17-year-old who 
murdered an innocent sheriff’s deputy,” conflating his core essence as a 
person with his past crime.123  
The lens of carceral conservatism can help to explain the dissenters’ 
intense affront in the juvenile LWOP cases about what might seem to be a 
relatively minor doctrinal adjustment.  Although the conservative Justices 
exaggerated the effects of Plata, they were right that it did involve a 
“prisoner release order.”  In contrast, none of the Court’s decisions in 
 
 120 Id. at 554. 
 121 See Stephen Yair Liebb & Héctor Oropeza, Opinion, The Supreme Court Got It Right on Prison 
Overcrowding in California, FOX NEWS (June 10, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/ 
06/10/opinion-us-supreme-court-decision-on-prison-overcrowding-in-california-
is.html#ixzz1P7ehIdxW (perspective of two longtime prisoners in the California system criticizing 
Scalia’s dissent for “ignor[ing] the reality that gyms have been used to house prisoners for many 
years, which is part of the problem brought on by overcrowding” and noting that “[w]eights have 
not been available in California prisons for more than a decade”) (last  updated Dec. 8, 2016); see 
also Brian Palmer, Do Prisoners Really Spend All Their Time Lifting Weights?, SLATE (May 24, 2011, 
6:02 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2011/05/do-prison-inmates-spend-all-their-time-
lifting-weights.html (explaining that state and federal prisons have generally not provided weights 
since the 1990s).  
 122 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 737, 743–44 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The term 
“inmate” is specifically experienced by many people in prison as dehumanizing.  Blair Hickman, 
Inmate. Prisoner. Other. Discussed, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 3, 2015, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/03/inmate-prisoner-other-discussed. 
 123 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Graham, Miller, and Montgomery required the states to actually release 
anyone, not even the named petitioners—all three of whom remain, as of 
this writing, in prison.124  At first glance, it is puzzling why such limited 
holdings would generate either celebration or worry.  But the dissenting 
Justices’ anger becomes more comprehensible if one understands them to 
be reading the Eighth Amendment from the standpoint of carceral 
conservatism, from the operating assumption that mass imprisonment as 
practiced in the United States today is a positive good.  Any judicial 
chipping away at the states’ prerogative to punish, however seemingly 
marginal, thus represents a grievous intrusion upon the capacity of states to 
protect public safety.  In Scalia’s view, “the Constitution does not require 
States to revise punishments that were lawful when they were imposed.”125  
What this means, translated into more concrete terms, is that the 
Constitution does not require Louisiana to contemplate the possibility of 
ever letting Henry Montgomery out of prison.  To hold otherwise, in 
Scalia’s words, would be “to upset” Louisiana’s scheme of punishment.126   
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the dissenting Justices in the 
juvenile LWOP cases read the Eighth Amendment through the lens of what 
might be termed carceral conservatism—the principle that mass 
imprisonment is generally a positive good and thus, when possible, the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause should not be read to disturb it unduly.  
The strongest counterargument to this account is what might be the Justices’ 
own objection: that their dissents are motivated not by their personal 
endorsement of any particular legislative choice, only by their commitment 
to structural principles like federalism and separation of powers, and/or to 
interpretive methods like originalism.  But this Article’s account is not 
incompatible with accepting at face value the conservative Justices’ 
commitments to these transsubstantive structural and interpretive principles.  
Deference toward state legislatures, for example, is certainly part of the mix 
in the juvenile LWOP dissents, and might even suffice to account for the 
raw vote counts in these cases as to outcomes.127  But the dissenting Justices’ 
rhetorical choices imply that, in Eighth Amendment cases, their decision-
making, however informed by transsubstantive interpretive commitments, 
also finds confirmation in a substantive, purposive commitment to insulate 
from judicial interference state decisions to punish. 
 
 124 DRINAN, supra note 18, at 130–31. 
 125 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 126 Id. at 742. 
 127 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 87 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (describing Eighth 
Amendment case law as “emphasiz[ing] the primacy of the legislature in setting sentences”). 
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On this point, it is illuminating to juxtapose the conservative Justices’ 
rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases with their rhetoric in other doctrinal 
contexts.  The American constitutional tradition provides jurists with a 
repertoire of stock phrases for signaling that they disagree with a legislative 
choice on the merits but feel duty-bound not to disturb that choice because 
of the constraints of the judicial role. Famously, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 
Justice Potter Stewart characterized Connecticut’s contraceptive ban as 
“uncommonly silly,” even “asinine,” but nevertheless, in his view, 
constitutional.128  In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Thomas recycled this same 
language to describe the Texas sodomy ban, and stated that if he were a 
Texas legislator he “would vote to repeal it,” even as he expressed the view 
that as a judge he felt “duty”-bound to uphold it.129 
More recently, every one of the dissenting Justices in the LWOP cases 
has provided, in Obergefell v. Hodges—the same-sex marriage case—an 
example of what it looks like when he is dissenting (or wishes to appear to 
be dissenting) purely for federalism or separation-of-powers reasons.  In 
Obergefell the identical line-up of dissenters insisted upon the importance of 
judicial deference to legislative decision-making, even as they each 
professed to be agnostic about, or even opposed to, the substance of the 
legislative decisions in question.   Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that 
there are “strong arguments” in favor of allowing same-sex marriage, 
“rooted in social policy and considerations of fairness.”130  Justice Scalia 
professed that the substantive law of marriage was “not of immense 
personal importance” to him; what concerned him was solely the majority’s 
“hubris” in overriding the states.131  Justice Thomas claimed that he 
personally was entirely agnostic about the value of marriage, observing that 
“[p]eople may choose to marry or not to marry” and opining that those 
“who choose not to marry” are no better or worse than anyone else.132  
And finally, Justice Alito criticized the Obergefell majority for choking off 
democratic deliberation about same-sex marriage by reading into the 
Constitution a modern, consent-based understanding of marriage, 
foreclosing the ability of states to retain a marriage regime based upon a 
“traditional,” gender-based understanding.  Justice Alito did not focus his 
criticism upon the substance of the modern understanding of marriage, but 
rather upon the Court’s arrogation of authority to settle the legislative 
 
 128 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 129 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 130 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 131 Id. at 2626, 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132 Id. at 2639 n.8 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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debate between the two.133 
The juvenile LWOP dissents do not convey the same affect of agnostic 
detachment present in the Obergefell dissents.  To the contrary, a sense of 
pique pervades the dissenting opinions in all three of the LWOP cases, a 
kind of verbal head-shaking at the majority’s perceived naiveté.  Justice 
Thomas’s Graham dissent accuses the majority of undermining the 
“integrity” of the “criminal justice system”—that is, not the institutional 
integrity of the judiciary, as in Obergefell, but the integrity of the substantive 
field of law being regulated.134  Consider also Justice Thomas’s summary of 
why states might find LWOP to serve valid penological goals.  Even the 
majority, Justice Thomas notes, “acknowledges” that juvenile LWOP has 
some deterrent and incapacitative effect, yet for some reason the majority 
finds those goals “inadequate” (the italics are Justice Thomas’s).135  Justice 
Thomas seems to be invoking vicariously the betrayal he imagines that 
legislators feel.  Throughout their opinions, the dissenting Justices deploy 
carefully selected nouns and adjectives to signal normative approval not 
simply of legislative sentencing discretion as a structural matter, but of the 
legislature’s sentencing choices as applied to these particular cases, 
characterizing the individuals involved as “depraved” “murderers” and 
“killers.”136  Justice Alito, for example, assesses the titular petitioner in Miller 
as having exhibited “brutality and evident depravity.”137  And although he 
nevertheless admits to harboring a degree of “sympathy” for Miller, he 
emphasizes that the petitioners before the Court represent only “two 
(carefully selected) cases” involving “very young defendants,” and hopes 
that readers will not “be confused by the particulars” of those two cases.138  
In other words, there are other defendants out there for whom Justice Alito 
presumably has less or no sympathy.  
The impression that the dissenting Justices intend to signal support for 
the state legislative choices under review is bolstered by their insertion of 
lurid anecdotes, drawn from news reports, of various brutal homicides 
committed by teenagers but unrelated to the cases at bar.  The dissenting 
Justices might be understood to be citing these news stories to provide 
examples of the kinds of horrific facts that, perhaps, they felt the cases at 
 
 133 Id. at 2641–42 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 134 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 118–19 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 135 Id. at 115–16. 
 136 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 494 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing 
prisoners serving LWOP for murders they committed before age 18 as “juvenile killers”). 
 137 Id. at 513 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 138 Id. 
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bar were lacking.  Justice Thomas, in Graham, describes at length an 
unrelated crime of unusual “brutality” committed by a sixteen-year-old in 
Oklahoma.139  If his goal with the dissent were simply to make a point 
about separation of powers and federalism as an abstract matter, this 
section with its gruesome details would seem gratuitous.  Instead, this 
passage operates as a signal of sympathy with states’ choices to sentence 
youth who behave this way to extreme prison sentences.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurrence in the judgment in Graham utilizes the same 
rhetorical strategy.  Chief Justice Roberts concurred only with the 
majority’s judgment that life without parole was a grossly disproportionate 
punishment for Graham himself—though emphasizing that he believed 
Graham “was dangerous and deserved to be punished,” just not punished 
with LWOP.140  But his concurring opinion takes pains to contrast 
Graham’s case with a litany of “reprehensible” comparators: a teenager 
“who beat and raped an 8-year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 
pounds of rock,” and a group of juveniles “who together . . . gang-raped a 
woman and forced her to perform oral sex on her 12-year-old son.”141  If 
the dissenting Justices’ strategy (conscious or otherwise) was to use these 
examples in order to rally support for harsh punishment among readers, 
then they were on the right track: a recent psychological study found that 
people primed with a vignette of a particular murder committed by a 
teenager were far more likely to endorse LWOP for juveniles than people 
surveyed in the abstract about their views on LWOP.142 
Justice Alito’s opinions provide similar hints of substantive agreement 
with the legislative choices under review.  “Determining the length of 
imprisonment that is appropriate for a particular offense . . . inevitably 
involves a balancing of interests,” he writes in Miller.143  So far, so 
deferential.  But then, in the next sentence, Justice Alito tips his hand.  “If 
imprisonment does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general 
population and prevents him from committing additional crimes in the 
outside world.”144  Here, then, is a positive endorsement of the value of 
prison.  If nothing else, prison incapacitates.  It removes people who are 
essentially “criminals” from society, thereby protecting everyone else from, 
 
 139 Graham, 560 U.S. at 112 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 92 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 141 Id. at 93–94. 
 142 Nicholas Scurich, Juvenile Murderers and “National Consensus,” 12 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 1, 
4–6 (2017).  
 143 Miller, 567 U.S. at 515 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 144 Id. 
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in Justice Alito’s words, “the risk that these convicted murderers, if released 
from custody, will murder again.”145  That practical consequence, really, is 
the gravamen of Justice Alito’s complaint with the majority.  Justice Alito’s 
logic is that marginally regulating the state’s ability to imprison necessarily 
has the effect of increasing the likelihood of future murders.  As an 
empirical matter, the relationship between imprisonment rates and violence 
levels is the subject of extensive and highly technical debates among social 
scientists.146  The point here is not to reopen this empirical debate, but to 
observe that Justice Alito assumes one particular answer to this empirical 
question and imports that empirical assumption into his jurisprudence as a 
lens through which to view Eighth Amendment cases. 
Chief Justice Roberts further signals his views in his Miller dissent.  
Unlike in Graham, in which Chief Justice Roberts concurred with the 
judgment, in Miller he joined the dissenters, arguing that the Eighth 
Amendment does not preclude states from imposing mandatory LWOP for 
juveniles who commit homicide.  Why did he switch his vote?  Because 
unlike Graham, which concerned a punishment few states ever imposed, 
Miller concerned a punishment that “most states” both permitted and 
“frequently impose[d].”147  Like Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts assesses 
punishment (which is usually to say, in the modern world, imprisonment), 
as a positive good, even perhaps a moral duty of the modern state: “A 
decent society protects the innocent from violence.  A mature society may 
determine that this requires removing those guilty of the most heinous 
murders from its midst, both as protection for its other members and as a 
concrete expression of its standards of decency.”148  Chief Justice Roberts 
then notes that “judges . . . have no basis for deciding” otherwise, but this 
separation-of-powers aside comes across as an afterthought.149  The 
proposition that a “mature society” “may” realize the necessity of 
“removing . . . heinous murder[ers] from its midst” leaves open the 
possibility that Chief Justice Roberts thinks different “mature societies” 
might reasonably reach different determinations on this question (which is 
perhaps why he does not vote with the carceral conservatives across the 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 For an introduction to the debate, see Wildeman, supra note 88 (finding that “the majority of the 
evidence now suggests . . . that incarceration’s effects on crime are not nearly as large as once 
suspected”).  See generally STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, DO PRISONS MAKE US 
SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM (2009). 
 147 Miller, 560 U.S. at 494 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 148 Id.  at 495. 
 149 Id. 
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board).150  But what is at least clear is that Chief Justice Roberts considers 
the choice to permanently “remov[e]” those convicted of murder an 
understandable one.  This is of course a political view that many Americans 
share, so there is nothing unusual about Chief Justice Roberts expressing 
this view, but it is indeed a political view and not simply an institutional 
commitment to the proper balance between judges and legislatures.  
Justice Thomas’s Graham dissent asserts that “[t]he question of what acts 
are ‘deserving’ of what punishments is bound so tightly with questions of 
morality and social conditions as to make it, almost by definition, a question 
for legislative resolution.”151  In other words, in Justice Thomas’s view, it is 
not that contingent arrangements in the United States happen to assign 
questions of punishment to legislatures, but that questions of punishment 
are on some deeper, essential level inherently legislative by their nature.  
One learns something interesting from this sentence.  If it were not for the 
“almost,” this sentence would read the Eighth Amendment out of the 
Constitution entirely.  The addition of the “almost” recasts the sentence as 
taking the more modest step of almost reading the Eighth Amendment out 
of the Constitution.  If questions about punishment and desert are “almost” 
by definition legislative questions, then what role are courts, applying the 
Eighth Amendment, supposed to play?  A very minimal one, presumably.  
The dissenting Justices’ rhetoric in the juvenile LWOP cases cannot be 
divorced from their social and historical context.  For the past forty years, 
American legislatures have generally exercised their authority to prescribe 
criminal sentences in a punitive way.  To defend the prerogative of 
legislatures against this backdrop is specifically to defend the prerogative of 
legislatures to punish harshly.  One cannot consider the dissenting Justices 
unaware of this fact; they occasionally make express references to this 
historical context.  Chief Justice Roberts, for example, provides in Miller a 
capsule summary of the familiar history in which the states rejected 
rehabilitation, beginning in the 1980s, and state-after-state decided “to 
reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing longer sentences in 
order to punish criminals and prevent them from committing more 
crimes.”152  Thus when he insists elsewhere in the same opinion on “respect 
for elected officials” and raises concerns about “invalidat[ing] the laws of 
dozens of legislatures,”153 we may reasonably assume that it is not legislative 
 
 150 Id. (emphasis added). 
 151 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 120 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 152 Miller, 560 U.S. at 495 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. at 498. 
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decision-making generically that he is anxious to defend, but the recent 
history of legislative decision-making in the service of the build-up of mass 
incarceration.  Justice Thomas too, in Graham, emphasizes the novelty of 
juvenile LWOP as a sentencing practice, describing how “over the past 20 
years” states have become more severe in how they punish youth, and have 
tended to abolish or limit the use of parole.154  Thus, when Justice Thomas 
elsewhere laments that the Miller majority has “[laid] the groundwork for 
future incursions on the States’ authority to sentence criminals,”155 it is hard 
to read that lament purely as an abstract federalism concern.  There would 
be no need to express a specific desire to protect, not the states’ authority 
generally, but “the states’ authority to sentence criminals,” except to signal 
agreement with the states’ determination that “criminals” are the essence of 
what prisoners are.156  And it is people who are essentially and incorrigibly 
criminals and killers, in the dissenting Justices’ view, whom even the 
Court’s quite deferential Eighth Amendment jurisprudence too often 
improperly “shield[s]” from due punishment.157 
In sum, a near-majority of the Roberts Court—and perhaps soon a 
majority—reads the Eighth Amendment from an apparent perspective of 
relative equanimity towards, or even approval of, legislative choices to 
further and maintain mass incarceration.  Understanding the Justices’ 
carceral conservativism can help to make sense of the seeming limpness of 
Eighth Amendment case law.  Scholars often characterize the Court’s 
minimal efforts at judicial review in this context as overly deferential to 
legislatures, or even as abdications of the Court’s responsibility to enforce 
the Eighth Amendment.158  But at least on the Roberts Court, the Justices’ 
own rhetoric suggests that something more than deference to the legislature 
is going on.  Rather, the Court’s disinterest in meaningful proportionality 
review of criminal sentences appears to reflect, at least for several of the 
Justices and at least in part, affirmative endorsement of the substance of the 
legislative decisions being made, as well as a purposive commitment to 
reading the Eighth Amendment so as to facilitate state practices and 
institutions of punishment. 
 
 154 Graham, 560 U.S. at 109–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 155 Miller, 567 U.S. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 156 Id. (emphasis added). 
 157 Graham, 560 U.S. at 101 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 158 E.g., Jacobi & Berlin, supra note 73, at 2101 (arguing that the Court has “abdicate[d] its role as the 
nation’s supreme constitutional arbiter in sentencing” and instead serves to “rubber stamp” 
popular sentiments, no matter how punitive); Stinneford, supra note 15, at 481 (characterizing 
Harmelin as reflecting “total deference to the legislature, not merely as to how to implement the 
prohibition of excessive punishments, but as to the meaning of excessiveness itself”). 
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Another objection to this Article’s account of carceral conservatism 
might concede that Justices Roberts and Alito tend to invoke 
consequentialist rationales for their votes, but maintain that the carceral 
conservative framework misrepresents the views of Justices Thomas and 
Scalia, whose real dispute with the majority in these cases derives from their 
commitment to originalism, not from any particular views about 
punishment.  Certainly this is how the Justices themselves characterize the 
divide in Eighth Amendment cases, as a divide between the majority’s 
mushy “evolving standards” and the conservative dissenters’ fidelity to the 
amendment’s original meaning.  Justice Thomas’s Miller dissent asserts, for 
instance, that most of modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
inconsistent “with the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause” and that Miller has further “compound[ed]” that 
inconsistency.159  Justice Alito, in Miller, also considers the Court to have 
“long ago abandoned the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”160  
In fact, the majority in these cases all but concedes this point.  Justice 
Stevens, in his short Graham concurrence, suggests that perhaps it is true 
that “a death sentence for a $50 theft by a 7-year-old” would not have 
offended Eighth Amendment standards once, but the standards “have 
evolved.”161  And in the view of Justice Stevens, this evolution is admirable.  
So too, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion frankly admits that the 
“evolving standards” framework is not grounded in originalism, but instead 
requires the Court to “look beyond historical conceptions” when applying 
the Eighth Amendment.162 
For what it is worth, scholars, including some who identify as 
originalists, have criticized Justices Scalia and Thomas’s purportedly 
originalist readings of the Eighth Amendment.163  But in any event, it is 
 
 159 Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 160 Id. at 510 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 161 Graham, 560 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 162 Id. at 58 (majority opinion). 
 163 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 85, at 1577, 1582–83 (arguing that Justices Scalia and Thomas’s 
position relies on an insufficiently nuanced picture of the common law treatment of juvenile 
offenders).  Lerner posits that it is possible to construct, at least for the sake of argument, a “living-
originalist” defense of Miller.  Id. at 1607.  For the broader debate about the original meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment, see supra note 82 (collecting sources).  In Justice Thomas’s view, prisoners 
serving LWOP simply cannot “argue that [their] sentences would have been among the ‘modes 
or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of 
Rights was adopted.’”  Miller, 567 U.S. at 503 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Graham, 560 
U.S. at 106 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).  Since “14-year-olds were subject to” adult punishments 
in 1791, at a time when “mandatory death sentences were common,” it must be “implausible,” in 
Justice Thomas’s view, “that a 14-year-old’s mandatory prison sentence—of any length, with or 
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both beyond the scope of this Article and unnecessary to this Article’s 
claims to adjudicate between the many competing originalist accounts of 
the Eighth Amendment.  There is no necessary inconsistency between 
accepting the Justices’ own claims that they are offering what they believe 
to be the best originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment and this 
Article’s argument that they find confirmation for their doctrinal 
conclusions in how they comport with some larger purposive 
commitment—in the same way that equal protection scholarship can 
describe originalist jurists as adhering to the principle of anti-classification, 
even if the Justices might explain that they believe such a principle 
comports with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
B.  Carceral Proceduralism 
The consistent majority voting bloc, across all three of the juvenile 
LWOP cases, consists of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan (Chief Justice Roberts voted with the majority in Graham and 
 
without parole—would have been viewed as cruel and unusual.”  Id.  One premise of Justice 
Thomas’s view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only bans certain “modes or 
acts” of punishment and that prison terms, of any length, are not among the prohibited modes.  
This premise, shared by both Justices Thomas and Scalia, has been questioned by both legal 
scholars and historians.  The premise derives from Justice Scalia’s account in Harmelin, disputed 
by Mannheimer, supra note 82, at 523, 525–26 (reviewing common law history and arguing that 
Justice Scalia misconstrued it); Lerner, supra note 85, at 1582 n.27 (discussing other originalist  
thought); Reinert, supra note 82, at 823 (arguing that “the jurisprudence of slavery demonstrates 
that the words ‘cruel’ and ‘unusual’ did not simply purport to regulate the mode of punishment, 
but also called for an inquiry into the excessiveness of punishment”); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay 
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the 
Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 786–92 (1975) 
(criticizing this reading of the Eighth Amendment).  In addition to the criticisms that other 
scholars have leveled, I would also note that a second and perhaps even more doubtful premise of 
Justice Thomas’s view is that, as of 1791, the Eighth Amendment was understood to import an 
accepted hierarchy of punishments, according to which death was worse than prison terms “of 
any length, with or without parole.”  See Miller, 567 U.S. at 503 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Thus, if death would be permitted for a certain type of offender in 1791, then applying the 
original understanding would require holding that LWOP must be permitted for that type of 
offender today.  In fact, the majority in the juvenile LWOP cases seems to share this premise, 
which is why they do not describe their interpretations as originalist.  But prison was not yet 
widely used in 1791, and there was no parole until the twentieth century, much less any concept 
of “life without parole.”  See MCLENNAN, supra note 38, at 32, 38 (noting that imprisonment did 
not become common in states until 1810).  Since LWOP is essentially still a death sentence, but a 
much more protracted one, it is at best unclear how it should be squared with the original 
meaning of “punishment.”  The meanings of life and death themselves were, of course, quite 
different in eighteenth-century understandings than they are today.  The premise that LWOP can 
be transhistorically calibrated as milder than death might be arguable, but the argument would 
require far more development than Justice Thomas gives it in the LWOP cases to be persuasive.   
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Montgomery, but not in Miller, for reasons that align him more closely with 
the dissenters’ carceral conservatism overall).164  In each case, the dissenting 
Justices accused this majority of conflating their own policy preferences 
with constitutional requirements, overriding the proper bounds of the 
judicial role and infringing upon the prerogative of state legislatures with no 
principled basis.  But in fact, an identifiable mediating principle is at work 
in these cases—and moreover, a principle that overlaps with the dissenters’ 
carceral conservatism to a surprising degree.  This principle might be 
termed “carceral proceduralism.” 
A close reading of the majority opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases 
yields the conclusion that for the most part, the Justices in the majority 
share the dissenters’ constitutional equanimity about prolonged 
imprisonment, certainly as to adult offenders in ordinary cases.165  They 
agree, or at least claim to agree, with the conservative dissenters that some 
people are incorrigible, and states may conclude that they deserve to be 
“condemned to die in prison.”166  “Retribution is a legitimate reason to 
punish,” explains Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Graham, and 
“[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions” on those who commit 
crimes.167  Incapacitation is not only a “legitimate” reason for 
imprisonment but also “an important goal”—and even in some cases, a 
goal “sufficient to justify life without parole.”168  Those who commit 
grievous offenses may “deserve[ ] to be separated from society for some 
time.”169  Actually, if there is any conventional philosophy of punishment 
that this bloc regards skeptically, it is only rehabilitation—a surprising 
sentiment to encounter in a line of cases ostensibly about the meliorative 
potential of youth. Rehabilitation, Kennedy suggests, “is imprecise” as a 
concept and debatable as a policy goal.170 
 
 
 164 Justice Stevens joined the majority in Graham but retired soon thereafter; I would generally 
include him in this bloc, although his Graham concurrence evinces a deeper commitment to the 
more openly moralistic version of “evolving standards of decency” that the rest of the Court has 
moved away from.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reading the Eighth 
Amendment to embody a “moral commitment” to engage in a continuous process of updating its 
meaning).  
 165 This is not to say that the individual Justices necessarily endorse mass incarceration as a policy 
matter; some of them probably do not. 
 166 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 167 Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (majority opinion). 
 168 Id. at 72. 
 169 Id. at 73. 
 170 Id. 
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The only difference is that the majority appends some procedural 
asterisks to its endorsements of carceral punishment.171  Although the Court 
often characterizes these procedural caveats as grounded in the 
proportionality principle,172 proportionality is a misnomer for the principle 
actually being applied in these cases. At least, the term proportionality 
should not be taken too literally.  The Court is not encouraging case-by-
case balancing of individual sentences against individual crimes.  Rather, 
proportionality operates in the juvenile LWOP cases as a term of art, 
signifying a categorical determination that certain special groups cannot (or 
ordinarily should not) be sentenced to certain very extreme punishments.  
Youth defines the boundaries of one such group, and with respect to 
LWOP, it may be the only such group (how far Miller will be extended to 
other groups remains to be seen).   Central to the majority opinions in 
Graham and Miller is an essentialized distinction between youth and adults, 
and it is that distinction which, at least in these cases, provides the primary 
constitutional limit on very long prison terms.  On the adult side of the 
divide, there are few if any constitutional limits on punishment-by-prison.  
The carceral proceduralist Justices agree with their conservative 
colleagues that, for the ordinary offender who has committed some grievous 
crime, prison is an understandable response, and they even agree that 
LWOP is an understandable response.  LWOP “may violate the Eighth 
Amendment when imposed on children,” the Miller Court held,173 which is a 
carefully worded way of strongly implying, without technically foreclosing 
the issue, that LWOP likely does not violate the Eighth Amendment when 
imposed on anyone else.  There are, the Court implies, legitimate 
“penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences” on some 
people—just not necessarily “on juvenile offenders.”174  The cases for 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are weak in the 
context of juvenile LWOP, the Court reasons, but that suggests the Court 
thinks there is some penological case to be made for adult LWOP.175  
 
 
 171 Id. at 71 (“Retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, but . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 172 In the Montgomery Court’s summary: “Protection against disproportionate punishment is the 
central substantive guarantee of the Eighth Amendment . . . .”  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. 
Ct. 718, 732 (2016); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory 
juvenile LWOP “violate[s] [the] principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 173 Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69–70). 
 174 Id. at 472; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 67–68. 
 175 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472–73. 
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In several passages in Graham, the majority contemplates and seems to 
accept perpetual incarceration as not only constitutionally permissible, but 
even understandable for certain people.  Consider the following sentence 
from Graham: “A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.”176  Now, remove the Graham-
specific details: “A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom.”  
Or consider this line in Graham’s discussion of penological goals: “To justify 
life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will 
be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the 
juvenile is incorrigible.  The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment 
questionable.”177  Presumably, then, that judgment is not necessarily 
questionable for others who lack “the characteristics of juveniles.”  And 
even as to juveniles, Graham emphasizes that the Eighth Amendment only 
prohibits a sentence of LWOP.  The Eighth Amendment “does not require 
the State [actually] to release” a juvenile sentenced to LWOP “during his 
natural life,” only to provide him with parole hearings.178  In other words: 
“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons 
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain 
behind bars for life.”179  A fortiori, then, the Eighth Amendment must not 
foreclose the possibility that, say, adults convicted of homicide “will remain 
behind bars for life.”180  Prison, then, is generally OK—even life in prison.  
The Eighth Amendment only “prohibit[s] States from making the 
judgment at the outset that [certain] offenders never will be fit to reenter 
society.”181  If that judgment is made some other time—but not “at the 
outset”—such a determination is potentially permissible.  
The majority’s commitment to procedural, rather than substantive, 
regulation of extreme forms of incarceration is especially evident in 
Montgomery, notwithstanding the Court’s convoluted efforts to construe 
Miller as “substantive” for purposes of the retroactivity analysis.  Although 
retroactivity jurisprudence is complex, the majority’s reasoning in 
Montgomery can be boiled down to a simple premise: “no resources 
marshaled by a State could preserve a conviction or sentence that the 
Constitution deprives the State of power to impose.”182  In the criminal 
 
 176 Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). 
 177 Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added). 
 178 Id. at 75; see also id. at 82 (holding that “[a] State need not guarantee the offender eventual 
release,” only “some realistic opportunity to obtain release”). 
 179 Id. at 75. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016). 
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procedure context, the leading argument against the retroactivity of new 
constitutional rules is the state interest in finality.  Declaring a rule 
retroactive disturbs the finality of long-ago criminal convictions, inviting 
prisoners to reopen their long-ago convictions and “forc[ing] the States to 
marshal resources” to defend those convictions anew.183  For the Montgomery 
majority, this interest is unavailing as to mandatory juvenile LWOP 
because mandatory juvenile LWOP is defined by Miller as a constitutional 
nullity.  But importantly, the component of the mandatory LWOP sentence 
that Montgomery identifies as a “constitutional nullity” is its mandatory 
nature.  It is not the experience of spending life in prison that is 
unconstitutional, but lack of an individualized procedure for determining 
whether someone will spend life in prison.  So long as such an 
individualized determination is provided, LWOP may still be imposed: 
Montgomery allows for the possibility “that a sentencer might encounter the 
rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that 
rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.”184  And even 
for life prisoners who are afforded the opportunity of parole hearings, 
Montgomery confirms that it is permissible for a state to deny parole at every 
one of those hearings—that is, to determine each time the question arises 
that the prisoner has demonstrated “an inability to reform.”185 
Unlike the dissenting Justices, the Justices in this bloc confront the 
reality and gravity of what an LWOP sentence means.  Whereas Chief 
Justice Roberts describes LWOP as “of course, far less severe than a death 
sentence,”186 Justice Kennedy readily acknowledges that a person sentenced 
to LWOP is essentially “condemned to die in prison.”187  In that sense, as 
the Court recognized in both Graham and Miller, a sentence of LWOP is not 
actually so different from a death sentence.  “Imprisoning an offender until 
he dies alters the remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrevocable,’” 
the Court observed in Miller.188  LWOP at least “for juveniles” is “akin to 
 
 183 Id. (alteration in original) 
 184 Id. at 733; see also id. at 734 (acknowledging possibility that LWOP “could be a proportionate 
sentence” for some juveniles). 
 185 Id. at 736. 
 186 Graham, 560 U.S. at 89 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 187 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (describing how 
petitioners were sentenced to “die in prison”).  Advocates and prisoners often refer to LWOP as 
“death by another name.”  See, e.g., Kenneth E. Hartman, Death by Another Name, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Oct. 23, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://themarshallprojet.org/2016/10/23/death-by-
another-name; see also Ross Kleinstuber et al., Into the Abyss: The Unintended Consequences of Death 
Penalty Abolition, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 185, 185–89 (2016) (collecting quotations and 
references using this formulation). 
 188 Miller, 567 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
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the death penalty.”189  That the majority bloc both recognizes the severity 
of LWOP and seems to generally accept the constitutional propriety of 
LWOP (subject only to modest procedural constraints, and even then only 
for certain limited categories of offenders) is perhaps the best evidence that 
they are operating within a doctrinal framework that is broadly accepting of 
mass imprisonment. 
III.  THE PLACE OF YOUTH IN THE POLITICS (AND JURISPRUDENCE) OF 
PUNISHMENT 
Youth awakes to a new world and understands neither it nor himself.  The whole 
future of life depends on how the new powers now given suddenly and in profusion 
are husbanded and directed.  Character and personality are taking form, but 
everything is plastic.” 
—G. Stanley Hall190 
[A] child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s, his traits are “less fixed” 
and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” 
—Miller v. Alabama191 
We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no 
sense of the future. 
—John J. DiIulio, Jr.192 
But what about Milagro Cunningham, a 17-year-old who beat and raped an 8-
year-old girl before leaving her to die under 197 pounds of rock in a recycling bin 
in a remote landfill? 
 —Graham v. Florida193 
Understanding the divide on the Roberts Court as a divide between two 
forms of essentially pro-carceral reasoning—carceral conservatism and 
carceral proceduralism—casts in a new light the juvenile LWOP cases’ 
 
 189 Id. at 475; see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (noting that LWOP sentences “share some 
characteristics with death sentences”). 
 190 1 ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, 
SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION, at xv (1904). 
 191 567 U.S. at 471 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
 192 The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/john-j-dilulio-jr/the-coming-of-the-super-predators. 
 193 560 U.S. at 93–94 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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deployment of the concept of “adolescence.”  This concept does not 
function in the cases as a wedge between a wing of the court that is broadly 
deferential toward punitive state policies and a wing of the court that is 
actively interventionist into punitive state policies.  All of the Justices appear 
to agree about the constitutionality of most of the forms of harsh 
punishment widely used in the United States today, such as the prolonged 
imprisonment of adults.  If their views were translated into a Venn 
diagram, they would largely overlap.  Adolescence represents the sliver of 
difference, the outer bound of the diagram at which the carceral 
conservatives remain untroubled and the carceral proceduralists insist that 
additional procedure should attend a particular punishment.  
The most revealing clash between the Miller majority and the various 
dissenters concerns the seemingly trivial matter of nouns.  Justice Kagan’s 
opinion consistently uses the word “children” to describe the adolescents 
under discussion; the Justices voting in the majority in the juvenile LWOP 
cases tend to describe the defendants as “boys.”194  Writing in dissent, Justice 
Alito mocks the majority’s use of the word “child” with square quotes: 
“Even a 17½-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns down 
a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ . . . .”195  Instead of the word 
“children,” Chief Justice Roberts tends to use the word “teenagers”; Justice 
Alito prefers more lurid descriptors such as “teenage murderers,” “killers,” 
“convicted murderers,” “murderers under the age of 18,” or, at greater 
length, “the category of murderers that the Court delicately calls ‘children’ 
(murderers under the age of 18).”196  “Seventeen-year-olds,” Justice Alito 
notes darkly, “commit a significant number of murders every year.”197 
That the treatment of young people would divide the Court, at the 
margins, is not surprising because the politics of punishment has long been 
intertwined with the politics of youth—with societal debates about how best 
to educate and discipline young people.  The anxieties about urban 
disorder that have propelled the growth of the American “carceral state” 
since the turn of the century have always been, in large part, anxieties 
about young people, whether labeled “juvenile delinquents,” “hoodlums,” 
or, later, “superpredators.”   Central to the politics of law and order in the 
United States has been a persistent concern about the collapse of the family 
under modernity—the sense that parents, and especially fathers, no longer 
 
 194 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465 (“[B]oys”); id. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[O]lder boys”); see also 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (“[A]s a 17-year-old boy.”). 
 195 Miller, 567 U.S. at 510 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 196 See id. at 498–99 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 513–15 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 197 Id. at 513. 
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retained the same authority over their children that they once had.198  In 
debates about education but also law, policymakers, lawmakers, law 
enforcers, jurists, and ordinary people puzzled over how the state might 
discipline youth into responsible adults if families could not be trusted.  The 
progressive “juvenile justice” movement pushed for the establishment of 
separate courts and institutions designed for the special needs of youth.199  
In the progressive view, wayward youth were not genuine “criminals” and 
could yet be “saved” through treatment.200  For a time, the rehabilitative 
impulse also motivated the punishment of adults in the United States to 
some extent, especially in some regions, but always with more controversy.  
By the 1970s the pendulum swung back and states “got tough.”201  The 
resultant matrix of policies, which produced and has maintained the 
current landscape of “mass incarceration,” included not only more punitive 
criminal law generally but also a rollback of “juvenile justice,” returning 
teenagers in many cases back to the ordinary courts and institutions of the 
“criminal justice” machinery.202 
In the juvenile LWOP cases, the two wings of the Court invoke these 
two different discursive legacies of the twentieth-century politics of 
punishment: the Progressive Era discourse of adolescence, which argued 
that young people remained in characterological development and thus 
should enjoy a moratorium on adult responsibilities and punishments (for 
both moral and utilitarian reasons—on the theory that youth treated with 
mercy might still reform, while youth punished overly harshly might 
become permanently stunted by the experience), and the post-World War 
II discourse of delinquency, which blended with the actuarial “new 
penology” of the late twentieth century to define youth as the most risky 
 
 198 See ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 133, 143–44 (1929).  Of course by the 1960s, texts like the Moynihan Report would 
translate this general concern into a specific racialized fear about the purportedly “matriarchal” 
black family which lacked a father figure altogether.  On the complex political and cultural 
debates occasioned by the Moynihan Report, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: 
AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH POVERTY 59–68 (2d ed. 2013). 
 199 DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205–10 (1980). 
 200 See, e.g., Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106–07 (1909) (suggesting that 
the juvenile offender may be on “the path that leads to criminality” but can still be developed into 
a “worthy citizen” and thus should be treated with the aim “not so much to punish as to reform 
. . . not to crush but to develop”). 
 201 See generally JULILLY KOHLER-HAUSMANN, GETTING TOUGH: WELFARE AND IMPRISONMENT IN 
1970S AMERICA (2017) (exploring the history of the decline of rehabilitation and the rise of 
deterrent punishment regimes in state prison systems during the 1970s). 
 202 See DRINAN, supra note 18, at 133 (reviewing this history). 
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and dangerous sector of the population.203  On this latter view, young 
people, far from meriting a moratorium on adult responsibility, were 
perhaps the group that it was most essential to incapacitate.  The 
conservative Justices’ dissenting opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases define 
adolescence not as the phase in which character is formed but as the 
moment when character is revealed. In this view, adolescents are essentially 
equivalent to adults—although if anything, more dangerous—both in their 
capacity for evil and their relatively fixed personality.  Horrific acts, when 
committed by teenagers and adults alike, signal unfixable pathologies that 
require removal from society. 
A.  The Significance of Adolescence for Carceral Proceduralism 
The majority opinions in the juvenile LWOP cases are constructed 
around an essentialized contrast between plastic adolescence and fixed 
adulthood.  This distinction is present in Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in Graham, but especially pervasive in Justice Kagan’s opinion for the 
Court in Miller.  After Graham, some commentators expressed hope that the 
Court might extend its logic about the extreme severity of LWOP to 
provide for more robust judicial review of LWOP sentences more generally, 
but Miller appears carefully crafted to foreclose that possibility.  Miller 
repeatedly emphasizes that it is only the differences between juveniles and 
adults that render LWOP sentences suspect when applied to juveniles—
implying that adults can be fully deserving of LWOP sentences: “[T]he 
distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing 
the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders . . . .”;204 LWOP “reflects ‘an 
irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,’ at 
odds with a child’s capacity for change.”;205 “[N]one of what [Graham] said about 
children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”206 (ergo: what Graham said about children is 
children-specific); and “[Y]outh matters in determining the appropriateness of a 
lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.”207  
 
 203 See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 452 (1992) (defining the “new penology” in 
criminological discourse as “an actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and statistical 
distributions applied to populations”). 
 204 Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added) (construing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)). 
 205 Id. at 473 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74). 
 206 Id. (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 69). 
 207 Id. (emphasis added) (construing Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–74). 
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Miller’s gloss on Graham is carefully crafted to cast no doubt on the 
constitutionality of LWOP for adults, emphasizing that in Graham, “juvenile 
status precluded a life-without-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive 
it for a similar crime.”208  Elsewhere in Miller, Justice Kagan specifies that the 
constitutional problem lies not with life-without-parole sentences generally, 
but with “subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence 
applicable to an adult.”209  The “foundational principle” of Graham, in Justice 
Kagan’s restatement, is that states may not punish “juvenile offenders . . . as 
though they were not children.”210  It is (only?) “juvenile status” or the 
“attributes of youth” that render LWOP suspect. 
In the name of saving juveniles from extreme punishment, then, Miller 
comes close to endorsing a pernicious implication: the notion that adults can 
be written off forever as incorrigible, as incapable of change.  The 
“‘signature qualities’” of youth, Justice Kagan emphasizes, “are all 
‘transient.’”211  It is only because youth is a fleeting and distinctively plastic 
phase of life that it is difficult to distinguish between “the juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”212  By 
implication, then, it is not rare for adults’ crimes to reflect irreparable 
corruption.  It is only because “children are different” that they cannot be 
“irrevocably sentenc[ed] . . . to a lifetime in prison.”213  By implication, 
then, adults can be irrevocably sentenced.  Justice Kagan’s discussion of 
Harmelin v. Michigan further nails this point.  Justice Kagan takes great pains 
to harmonize Miller’s holding, invalidating mandatory LWOP for (juvenile) 
homicide, from the holding of Harmelin, which upheld mandatory LWOP 
for (adult) cocaine possession.  Youth does all of the work of squaring the 
two otherwise seemingly inconsistent holdings: “Harmelin had nothing to do 
with children . . . . We have by now held on multiple occasions that a 
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”214  In 
other words, there exist two separate and self-contained regimes of 
constitutional law of punishment—one for “children” and one for 
“adults”—and these two regimes “[have] nothing to do” with each other.215  
The dissenters seem to agree with this larger point.  Chief Justice Roberts, 
 
 208 Id. (emphasis added). 
 209 Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 476. 
 212 Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 213 Id. at 480. 
 214 Id. at 481. 
 215 Id. 
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in his Miller dissent, worries that the majority opinion could be extended to 
call into question other common practices in juvenile justice, such as the 
practice of trying juveniles as adults.216  Tellingly, neither he nor any other 
Miller dissenter expresses any worry that Miller will have any spillover effect 
on adult sentencing. 
Miller, then, could be read to affirm the constitutional status of LWOP 
as an acceptable form of punishment, except in very limited circumstances 
concerning juvenile offenders.  (And even for juveniles, after all, Miller 
leaves intact the option to impose LWOP for homicide crimes, it just 
cannot be imposed automatically.)  Leaving LWOP constitutionally intact is 
tantamount to leaving mass imprisonment constitutionally intact, because 
LWOP functions in many ways as the anchor for mass incarceration, 
calibrating the entire scale of punishment in the United States at an 
extremely harsh baseline. ⁠217  LWOP is a relatively recent invention, dating 
to the 1970s if not later in most states, and remains virtually unknown 
outside of the United States.218  The availability of LWOP, along with the 
routine use of life prison terms more generally, plays a large role in making 
the United States an extreme outlier in international comparison.219  As 
Jonathan Simon explains, normalizing extreme sentences for the most 
serious crimes has “an inflationary effect on the whole structure of 
punishment,” “mak[ing] it far easier to set high sentences for all manner of 
less serious offenses.”220  The United States’ anomalous tolerance for life 
sentences thus functions as the “anchor of a system of over-punishment” 
more generally.221  While introducing narrow limits on the punishment of 




 216 Id. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 217 Beckett, supra note 89, at 19 (stating that LWOP “sentences not only contribute to mass 
incarceration in a quantitative manner but also raise crucial ethical, humanitarian, and human-
rights concerns”).  See generally Judith Lichtenberg, Against Life without Parole, 11 WASH. U. JUR. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3172899 
(arguing that LWOP cannot be justified on philosophical grounds). 
 218 See Michelle Miao, Replacing Death with Life? The Rise of LWOP in the Context of Abolitionist Campaign in 
the United States, 14 NW. U. J.L. & SOC. POL. (forthcoming 2018) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039994 (finding that LWOP was 
promoted as an alternative to the death penalty, although it did not necessarily reduce capital 
punishment). 
 219 See generally Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 1034 (finding that many countries in Europe have milder 
systems of criminal punishment than the U.S.). 
 220 Simon, supra note 31, at 1249. 
 221 Id. at 1246. 
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It is thus worth reflecting upon the basis for the Court’s essentialized 
distinction between youth and adults.  The Court cites findings from 
neuroscience and developmental psychology to support its analysis, but the 
scientific evidence alone cannot explain the totality of the Court’s decision-
making process.222  After all, and as both the dissenting Justices and legal 
scholars have pointed out, the science does not necessarily support such a 
stark divide between the moral capacity of adolescents and adults.223  
Rather, what seems to motivate the majorities in these cases is the need to 
confine in some way the limits on punishment being introduced—the need 
to ensure that the rules established in these cases remain exceptional and do 
not swallow up the Court’s default equanimity toward mass imprisonment.  
The difference between teenagers and adults works well to provide such a 
limiting principle, partly because of the availability of scientific evidence to 
lend the distinction objective trappings, but also because adolescence is 
such an entrenched trope in American discourse (legal and otherwise).  
Indeed, the neuroscientific findings cited by the Court—suggesting that 
adolescents tend to be more impulsive than adults and also more 
susceptible to peer pressure—resonate as true because they comport with 
our inherited, cultural common sense about the life course and our deeply 
embedded moral scripts of individual personality and responsibility.  As 
Terry Maroney has written: “Adolescent brain science has become a quick, 
culturally salient way to reference those qualities we think are special about 
juveniles, such as immaturity, impulsivity, and malleability.”224  
Adolescence also connotes instability and uncertainty, which makes it an 
apt category to invoke when insisting upon additional procedure; if the 
character of an adolescent is presumed to be especially hard to know, then 
it makes sense to insist on greater procedural safeguards when evaluating 
adolescent character in order to reduce the risk of adjudicative error. 
 
 
 222 For a telling indicator of some juvenile justice scholars’ view that neuroscience is at least in part a 
rhetorical overlay rather than a determinant of policymaking, see William S. Bush & David S. 
Tanenhaus, Introduction, in AGES OF ANXIETY: HISTORICAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (William S. Bush & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2018) 
(characterizing “the current obsession with brain science” as an example of “reformers’ rhetorical 
choices”); cf. Gertner, supra note 23, at 1042–43 (suggesting that the Court reached outcomes in 
Miller and Graham partly because “the arguments were based on science,” which seems more 
objective than “norms, policy choices, or values”).  
 223 See Lerner, supra note 85, at 1604 (criticizing the Graham majority’s “sweeping statements of 
juvenile immaturity” as “problematic,” partly because, “[a]s a descriptive matter, the 
categorization of teenagers as amorphously defective, vis-a-́vis adults, is doubtful”). 
 224 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 203 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014). 
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Adolescence is essentially an invention of the early twentieth century, 
when developmental psychology, the study of how individuals grow and 
change throughout their lives, was consolidating as an academic 
discipline.225  By the 1920s, most educators and psychologists had adopted 
the pioneering psychologist G. Stanley Hall’s theory of adolescence as a 
“moratorium on adult responsibility,” developed beginning in the 1890s 
and first published in a 1904 treatise.226  Applying the nineteenth-century 
maxim that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” Hall posited that each 
human life replicated in miniature the evolution of the human race.  Babies 
were savages, while older children might achieve a level of primitive 
maturity.  Adolescence was the crucial window in which an individual 
would either attain civilization or be forever arrested at some lower stage.  
Through the turmoils of puberty, each adolescent relived in microcosm 
“some ancient period of storm and stress” for the human race, “when old 
moorings were broken and a higher level attained.”227 
Hall identified modern adolescence as a period of great promise, both 
for individual adolescents and society as a whole, but also great peril.  The 
collective development of so many individual teenagers held the potential to 
raise humanity to ever-new heights of refinement.  But for Hall, living 
through a historical moment of rapid urbanization and industrialization, 
that possibility of progress was threatened by “urbanized hothouse life,” 
which “tend[ed] to ripen everything before its time.”228  Modern consumer 
culture, in his view, too often lured American youth away from the 
strictures of “duty and discipline” into the realm of “temptations,” 
 
 225 See KENT BAXTER, THE MODERN AGE: TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY AMERICAN CULTURE AND 
THE INVENTION OF ADOLESCENCE 3–5 (2008) (arguing that the construct of adolescence 
emerged in the early twentieth century “because it fulfilled specific cultural needs” at a time of 
rapid modernization); STEVEN MINTZ, THE PRIME OF LIFE: A HISTORY OF MODERN 
ADULTHOOD 9–10 (2015) (describing how both old age and adolescence began to be perceived in 
new ways during the late nineteenth century).  For an account that emphasizes the role of 
structural societal changes in the emergence of adolescence (including technology, rising 
affluence, and urbanization and other demographic changes), see, generally, Frank A. Fasick, On 
the “Invention” of Adolescence, 14 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 6 (1994). 
 226 Joseph F. Kett, Reflections on the History of Adolescence in America, 8 HIST. FAM. 355, 370–71 (2003); see 
also John Demos & Virginia Demos, Adolescence in Historical Perspective, 31 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
632, 635–38 (1969). 
 227 HALL, supra note 190, at xiii.  For an overview of Hall’s work and influence, see, generally, 
BAXTER, supra note 225, at 44–72.  Because there is a sizable historical literature on adolescence 
alone, including Hall (and Hall is also treated by historians of gender, psychology, and eugenics, 
among others), I do not cite comprehensively to that literature here, but refer interested readers to 
Baxter’s summary and citations to the literature. 
 228 HALL, supra note 190, at xi. 
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“precocities,” and “the mad rush for sudden wealth.”229  To counteract 
these trends, societal institutions must carefully control the conditions of 
adolescence, channeling youthful energy and the will to explore into 
disciplined, age-appropriate activities such as sports.  Hall attributed 
delinquency to social causes; youth misbehaved when their development 
was stunted by oppressive institutions.  Truants, for example, had given 
into “a mania for simply going away,” breaking out of the schoolroom 
cages where “pubescent boys and even girls often feel like animals in 
captivity.”230 
Hall placed such great emphasis on the importance of carefully 
structuring laws, institutions, and opportunities around the special needs of 
adolescents because he believed that after adolescence, the opportunity to 
reform the character would be largely lost.  “Criminals,” in his view, were 
“much like overgrown children” who had failed to master self-control 
during the adolescent window of opportunity; they were “egoistic, foppish, 
impulsive, gluttonous, blind to the rights of others.”231  The most important 
lesson to learn while growing up, Hall explained, was that “self-control, the 
development of which in the individual is the unconscious but perhaps 
primary purpose of family, church, state, laws, customs, and most social 
institutions.”232  To the extent that individuals within the community 
strengthened their “power of self-control,” then society as a whole would 
progress.  Hall recommended “magnanimity and a large indulgent parental 
and pedagogical attitude” toward all young people, “and especially toward 
juvenile offenders.”233  Children who were guided compassionately through 
the “storm and stress” of adolescence might come out on the other side 
having learned the right lessons, but children who were punished overly 
harshly might become forever stunted.234  Instead of evolving into 
disciplined, orderly adults, children who were not carefully directed by their 
parents and teachers risked “evol[ving]” into “habitual” criminals.235  
Although Hall’s ideas were more of a synthesis of then-reining ideas 
than an original contribution, and soon fell out of favor within academic 
psychology, his model of adolescence would remain enormously influential 
 
 229 Id. at xv. 
 230 Id. at 348.  
 231 Id. at 338. 
 232 Id. at 339. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 306. 
 235 Id. at 332. 
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upon American understandings of the life course.236  Hall’s conception of 
adolescence remade American society in countless lasting ways, 
underwriting the development of juvenile courts, the expansion of high 
schools, the development of youth activities and sports.  While biologists no 
longer invoke recapitulation theory, and many of Hall’s specific claims 
would sound bizarre or even disturbing to a modern reader (not to mention 
his eugenic predilections), his central image of adolescence as a time of 
“storm and stress” remains the dominant common-sense understanding of 
the teenage years.  Adolescents are turbulent, hormonal, not yet fully in 
control of their behavior, not yet who they will one day become.  As literary 
scholar Kent Baxter writes, Hall’s “extremely evocative yet quite evasive 
notion of the ‘storm and stress’ of adolescence . . . was an immensely 
popular way of depicting this age group, and the anxiety of what might 
happen if this tempest got out of control was shared by many 
Americans.”237 
It is essentially Hall’s vision of adolescence that pervades the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in Graham and Miller.  In Justice Kagan’s restatement of 
this line of cases, “children are constitutionally different from adults for 
purposes of sentencing” because of “three significant gaps between juveniles 
and adults”: (1) immaturity, which “lead[s] to recklessness, impulsivity, and 
heedless risk-taking”; (2) heightened vulnerability to family and peer 
pressure (partly due to lack of control over circumstances); and (3) 
incomplete characterological formation.238  This third reason is especially 
important for understanding what, in the Court’s view, differentiates 
adolescents from adults.  In Justice Kagan’s summary, “a child’s character 
is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions 
less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’”239  Although the 
Court has variously invoked “common sense,” “what every parent knows,”⁠ 
“science,” and “social science” as the sources of authority for this model of 
adolescence, and has increasingly dressed up its holdings with references to 
neuroscience, the basic outlines are a simplified, common-sense version of 
Hall’s model of adolescence, which has long been influential (if not 
 
 236 See Demos & Demos, supra note 226, at 636 (noting that, while Hall “has been largely forgotten, if 
not rejected outright,” the “‘special cult of adolescence’ seems to have lost no strength at all[,] 
[a]nd it was Hall, more than anyone else, who fixed it in our imagination”). 
 237 BAXTER, supra note 225, at 5.  In addition to Hall, Baxter also emphasizes the role of Margaret 
Mead’s anthropological studies in influencing the common understanding of adolescence.  Id. at 
44–71. 
 238 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 
(2005)).  
 239 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
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hegemonic) in American culture.240  
The majority’s implied construction of adults as fixed and fully 
responsible agents—in contrast to mutable adolescents—also resonates with 
deeply entrenched cultural scripts.  The invention of adolescence proceeded 
in tandem with the discovery of “adulthood,” the state of maturity toward 
which adolescents are developing.  (Etymologically, adolescence literally 
means the process of growing into an adult.)241  The word “adulthood” 
dates to the 1860s, but gained prominence as a cultural construct after 
World War II, when “adulthood” came to be equated with “maturity, 
settling down, and adher[ing] to proscribed gender roles.”242  As youth 
became idealized as a time of exploration and freedom, adulthood became 
increasingly defined by contrast, as a time of constraint and stability—of 
marriage, family, career, and home.  If adolescence meant change and 
growth, adulthood meant continuity, stability, permanence, “settl[ing] 
down.”243  As historian Steven Mintz notes, this conception of adulthood 
has always been more mythical than real; there has never been a time 
“when a majority of Americans experienced what we might consider the 
model life script: a stable marriage and a long-term career working for a 
single employer.”244  Since the 1960s, this purported experience of 
“traditional adulthood” has become increasingly detached from the actual 
experience of adulthood for the majority of Americans (whether these shifts 
are blamed on economic inequality, civilizational decline, or simply the 
normal processes of cultural change).245  Nevertheless, the conception of 
adulthood as a time of fixity, during which a person has a stable household, 
career, personality, and character—for better or worse—retains a strong 
hold on American culture.  
This twentieth-century ideal of adulthood, as a time when one has 
attained one’s permanent, fixed state of being, lurks between the lines of the 
Supreme Court’s adolescence canon.  Beneath every description of 
teenagers in Graham and Miller is an implied counter-description of adults.  
 
 240 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 241 See BAXTER, supra note 225, at 11 (noting that “the adolescent stage of development is often seen 
as the path by which the child becomes an adult,” and the concept adolescence thus denotes “this 
process of becoming”). 
 242 MINTZ, supra note 225, at xi. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at ix–x. 
 245 Id. at x.  For a thoughtful discussion of the legal implications of this shift, see generally Vivian E. 
Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55 (2016).  For a representative example of 
a polemic in the “civilizational decline” vein, see BEN SASSE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN ADULT: 
OUR COMING-OF-AGE CRISIS AND HOW TO REBUILD A CULTURE OF SELF RELIANCE (2017). 
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Juveniles “have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility,” “leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-
taking”—ergo, adults are (or should be) mature, responsible, careful, 
thoughtful, and appropriately risk-averse.246  Juveniles “are more 
vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, including from 
their family and peers; they have limited control over their own 
environment”—ergo, adults are (or should be) impervious to pressure, self-
directed, and fully in control of their circumstances.  “[A] child’s character 
is not as ‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions 
less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievable depravity’”—ergo, adults have 
relatively well formed characters, their traits are largely fixed, and their 
actions may well signify that they are irretrievably depraved.247  When 
presented in this way, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller is less an 
optimistic account of youth than it is a very dark account of adults.  If the 
horrible crimes of teenagers can sometimes be false alarms, the horrible 
crimes of adults really are signs that they are simply too far gone to merit 
inclusion in society.  (The Miller dissenters share this same dark view of 
adults, except that they think it equally applies to teenagers.) 
Scholars have observed the sharp distinction in the way that Eighth 
Amendment case law treats juveniles and adults.248  Yet they have generally 
interpreted (or criticized) this distinction as an unfortunate inconsistency 
within the case law, which provides different constitutional rules for 
juveniles and adults, creating a “two-track” Eighth Amendment.249  Or they 
have debated the extent to which this distinction corresponds with some 
“true” biological reality about teenagers as compared to adults.  The two-
track set of rules makes sense if both tracks are understood to flow from the 
singular, overarching logic of carceral proceduralism: harsh imprisonment 
is generally constitutional, but should be procedurally regulated at the outer 
 
 246 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); id. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)). 
 247 Id.  at 471 (majority opinion) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)). 
 248 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 28, at 69 (noting that the Court has only recognized “narrow exceptions 
to states’ punishment power”); Stinneford, supra note 15, at 473 (“Rules governing adult 
imprisonment are driven by a desire to avoid interference with legislative power, while rules 
governing death penalty and juvenile life imprisonment cases are driven by a desire to limit 
punishment practices the Supreme Court considers pernicious . . . .”). 
 249 See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 15, at 442–43 (describing Eighth Amendment doctrine as reflecting 
opposite presumptions that govern cases depending on their category, which he conceptualizes as 
“implementation rules”); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of 
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2009) 
(similarly characterizing the Court’s jurisprudence as proceeding along different tracks, but 
identifying the dividing line as between capital and non-capital cases). 
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bounds.  In Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, the construct of adolescence 
provides those bounds, because it introduces procedural uncertainty into 
the equation.  Adolescents are not yet who they will later be, so unlike with 
adults, it is harder to know if they “deserve” punishments like LWOP; 
additional procedures are needed to avoid the risk of error. 
B.  The Danger of Adolescents for Carceral Conservatism 
From the perspective of carceral conservatism, imprisonment may 
sometimes be the proper response to certain acts thought to signal a person’s 
dangerousness or inherently “criminal” nature, regardless of the individual 
attributes of the person who committed the acts—such as their age.  
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the dissenting Justices largely reject the 
constitutional significance of the differences between adolescents and 
adults.250  Indeed, it is Justice Thomas, writing in dissent, who most explicitly 
recognizes the majority’s debt to G. Stanley Hall.  Justice Thomas questions 
not only the constitutional status of adolescence but also the concept’s 
empirical basis.  In his Graham dissent, to support the proposition that most 
teenagers can perform “adult-like moral reasoning” and thus should be held 
morally accountable in the same way as adults, Justice Thomas cites a pop-
psychology book entitled The Case Against Adolescence.251  Written by 
psychologist Robert Epstein, this book is explicitly framed as a debunking of 
G. Stanley Hall.  Hall “didn’t create adolescence,” Epstein has written, “but 
he certainly reified it, claiming that the teen turmoil he saw at the turn of the 
twentieth century was a necessary feature of the teen years.”252  Epstein argues 
that Hall’s view of adolescence, based on “faulty” and “discredited” 
understandings of biology, should be abandoned and that teenagers should 
instead be given “serious doses of real responsibility.”  This argument is 
encapsulated in the book’s subtitle (not reproduced in the Supreme Court 
opinion): Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen.253  Epstein’s personal website 
includes the following endorsement by former speaker of the house Newt 
 
 250 Lerner offers a scholarly version of this argument, suggesting that in fact the modern tendency to 
insulate adolescents from full moral responsibility is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” that creates 
irresponsible teenagers.  Like Justice Thomas, Lerner draws partly on Epstein, as well as on the 
writings of James Q. Wilson.  See Lerner, supra note 85, at 1604 n.172, 1609. 
 251 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 118 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing ROBERT EPSTEIN, 
THE CASE AGAINST ADOLESCENCE: REDISCOVERING THE ADULT IN EVERY TEEN 171 (2007)). 
 252 ROBERT EPSTEIN, TEEN 2.0: SAVING OUR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FROM THE TORMENT OF 
ADOLESCENCE 73 (2010). 
 253 EPSTEIN, supra note 251. 
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Gingrich: “Adolescence is a social experiment that has failed.”254 
Yet if the carceral conservative perspective rejects adolescence as a 
social and political project intended to insulate youth from responsibility, it 
readily characterizes youth in categorical terms in other ways.  For all its 
oddities, Hall’s view of adolescence was ultimately optimistic—with the 
right institutions and policies in place, he thought that teenagers could lead 
the way to a more civilized world255—but of course, Americans have also 
historically projected their anxieties and fears about modern life onto 
teenagers, from the 1950s wave of political investigations into “juvenile 
delinquency” through the “superpredator” panic of the 1990s.256  Perhaps 
the most important influence upon the carceral conservative conception of 
youth as an especially dangerous group were the racialized anxieties of the 
1960s, when policymakers—across the partisan political spectrum, 
notably—began to worry about a seemingly endemic “urban crisis.”257  In 
truth, African-American children had never enjoyed the same 
presumptions of innocence and potential in American culture that defined 
childhood and adolescence for other groups.258  But in the postwar decades, 
the policy discourse of “crime” became intertwined with anxieties about 
urban decline.  Politicians worried about how to manage young, 
unemployed, African-American men in the nation’s deindustrializing cities, 
who became the public face of the political concept of “crime”—crime as 
politicians used the word, not as an individual noun denoting a particular 
act of wrongdoing, but as a collective shorthand denoting an amorphous 
miasma of violence and disorder that permeated the postwar American 
 
 254 See Adolescence & Adultness, DREPSTEIN.COM, http://drrobertepstein.com/index.php/adolescence 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
 255 See BAXTER, supra note 225, at 62–63 (noting the “rehabilitative quality” in Hall’s theory, which 
posits that “if a correct path of development is pursued” during adolescence, then both individual 
adolescents and the human race will progress in a beneficial direction). 
 256 See generally JAMES GILBERT, A CYCLE OF OUTRAGE: AMERICA’S REACTION TO THE JUVENILE 
DELINQUENT IN THE 1950S (1988); DiIulio, supra note 192.  Baxter observes that even Hall’s 
concept of adolescence was, from its emergence, “closely tied to fears about juvenile 
delinquency,” and thus was double-edged, conveying both ideal hopes for young people but also 
“connotations of savagery and barbarity.” BAXTER, supra note 225, at 15.  Hall worried 
extensively about juvenile crime.  See id. at 65–66. 
 257 See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN 
POSTWAR DETROIT 4 (1996) (summarizing competing explanations over the decades for 
“persistent, concentrated, racialized poverty” in deindustrializing inner cities). 
 258 See TERA EVA AGYEPONG, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BLACK CHILDREN: RACE, GENDER, AND 
DELINQUENCY IN CHICAGO’S JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1899–1945, at 3–6 (2018) (arguing 
that the rehabilitative discourse that animated the juvenile courts movement was primarily 
intended to benefit poor white and European immigrant children, whereas black children were 
not necessarily viewed as innocent and vulnerable in the same way).  
598 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:2 
   
 
city.259  Beginning with the Johnson Administration’s declaration of “War 
on Crime” and continuing through the Nixon and Reagan regimes, the 
federal government provided new forms of criminal justice funding and 
ideological support that encouraged local and state governments, in turn, to 
engage in an unprecedented campaign of surveillance, policing, arrest, and 
punishment of urban youth, laying the foundations for the phenomenon of 
mass incarceration that continues today.260   
Tough-on-crime politics is sometimes framed in legal scholarship as an 
understandable if regrettable excess in response to a preceding uptick in 
youth crime.261  New historical scholarship, drawing upon research into the 
decision-makers’ archives, tends instead to describe both the postwar 
punitive turn and the urban disorder to which it responded as produced in 
tandem, by distorted patterns of public investment and disinvestment in 
troubled communities.262  Policymakers began from the premise that youth, 
and especially urban minority youth, constituted dangers to be managed 
rather than children with potential to be cultivated.  This perspective 
resonates with contemporaneous criticisms made by some juvenile justice 
scholars even in the midst of the twentieth century’s successive crime 
panics.  Urban minority youth, in Barry Feld’s description, became defined 
as “bad kids” who required punishment, not social welfare programs.263  As 
Franklin Zimring wrote with reference to the later panic of the 1990s, but 
with resonance for understanding earlier moments of panic as well, 
discussions about youth violence have had a tendency to devolve into 
 
 259 See generally ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE 
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016). 
 260 See generally id. at 1–4 (summarizing this progression). 
 261 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, American Evil: A Response to Kleinfeld on Punishment, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 179, 
188 (2018) (“American criminal justice’s harshness began as a response to a real problem: the spike 
in crime . . . .”).  But see Thompson, supra note 36, at 708–711 (questioning this standard account). 
 262 See generally HINTON, supra note 259.  For earlier antecedents, see generally KHALIL GIBRAN 
MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).  For a careful attempt at the height of the tough-on-crime 
1990s to distinguish between perception and reality in the “youth violence epidemic,” see 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 31–48 (1998).  Zimring found “no 
unitary trend” in youth arrest rates (with reported increases for some categories of offenses 
attributable to changing police reporting standards).  There was a sharp increase in youth arrests 
for homicide between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, but he attributed this not to a new and 
uniquely vicious breed of youth, but rather to an increase in gun violence.  “Knives are 
universally available,” he noted, but “the rate of killings with knives remained stable,” suggesting 
that there was some change in the use or availability of guns, not a general uptick in “destructive 
intentions.”  Id. at 37–38.  Without wading into the empirical debate here, I note this study only 
to point out that even at the height of the 1990s panic about youth crime the evidentiary basis for 
these policy changes was debated.  
263  Feld, supra note 85, at 6–8. 
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“fatalistic determinism,” with certain categories of youth all but written off 
as inevitably destined for criminality.  This type of fatalism could then 
become an “excuse for disinvestment in urban youth development,” 
“blaming the toddler” today for crimes he may commit tomorrow rather 
than investing in his education and environment, and thus making 
predictions of delinquency self-fulfilling.264  
One consequence of the “War on Crime” paradigm in postwar 
American social policy was to roll back many of the juvenile justice reforms 
introduced in the Progressive Era under the sway of Hall’s model of 
adolescence—such as separate juvenile courts and an emphasis on 
rehabilitation over punishment.  Waves of punitive lawmaking targeting 
youth swept the nation first in the 1970s, although with relatively “modest” 
impact in most states, and then again in the 1990s, with more lasting and 
wide-reaching effects.265  By the mid-1990s, policymakers described urban, 
primarily African-American and Latino teenagers as an essentially 
predatory class that could not be reformed, but could only be contained 
through prolonged incarceration.266  In the infamous article that introduced 
the term “super-predators” to political discourse, John DiIulio confessed his 
own fear of teenage boys who had grown up in what he called “moral 
poverty,” “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults in 
abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings,” and who 
now had “absolutely no respect for human life.”267  DiIulio held out hope 
that future inner-city children could be spared this fate through expanded 
public investment in religion.  But for those already in their teens, he 
lamented, it was already too late: “In deference to public safety, we will 
have little choice but to pursue genuine get-tough law-enforcement 
 
264 ZIMRING, supra note 262, at 64; see also id. at 195 (“The largest failure of perspective in the youth 
crime panic . . . was a refusal to comprehend the multiple potentials and the contingency of a 
generation of young children not yet starting school when the bloodbath predictions were 
made.”).  For a compassionate study of the feelings of stigma and shame that African-American 
and Latino youth experience when even their ordinary day-to-day behaviors are defined as 
inherently threatening and potentially criminal, see VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE 
LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS (2011).  Rios agrees with previous scholars that 
criminalization can become a self-fulfilling “destiny,” but also emphasizes youth agency and 
resistance, finding that many develop a new political consciousness in response to their treatment; 
he argues for policy approaches that seek to encourage, educate, and support young people, 
rather than label or punish them.  Id. at xv, 158.  
 265 ZIMRING, supra note 262, at 4. 
 266 See id at 4–6 (collecting quotations and citations from the 1990s in which policymakers used the 
term “super-predators” and expressed fears of a “coming storm of violent youth crime”). 
 267 DiIulio, supra note 192. 
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strategies against the super-predators,” DiIulio concluded.268  “No one in 
academia is a bigger fan of incarceration than I am.”269  In this hysterical 
discursive milieu, state after state rewrote their criminal and sentencing 
laws so that teenagers could be tried “as adults,” in regular criminal court 
rather than in specialized juvenile courts, and punished more harshly, often 
sent to regular prisons rather than specialized treatment facilities.270  Thus, 
the phenomenon of “juvenile LWOP” that the Court, in recent years, has 
been asked to evaluate.271 
This history is familiar to scholars of juvenile justice, but rehearsing it 
here is important because when juxtaposed with the dissenting opinions in 
the juvenile LWOP cases, the rhetorical resonances become unmistakable.  
Among conservatives in the political branches of government, the “tough-
on-crime” stance is no longer universal; an alliance of fiscal conservatives, 
evangelical Christians, and libertarians now calls for criminal justice reform 
to mitigate the fiscal excesses and moral harms of mass incarceration.272  
DiIulio himself has since disavowed his “superpredator” writings, and many 
other authors of the late-twentieth-century prison boom have since 
expressed regrets.273  But on the Roberts Court, 1990s-style carceral 




 268 Id. 
 269 Id.  
 270 See ZIMRING, supra note 262, at xi (describing how in the 1990s, “virtually every state . . . changed 
the laws designed to cope with violence by offenders under 18” because of the perception that 
youth violence had become “a national emergency”); id. at 11–15 (summarizing the most 
common forms of legislation used by states in the 1990s to increase penalties for youth crime).  At 
the same time, states also made it possible to impose harsher punishments within the juvenile 
justice system itself, blurring the distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal courts.   See id. 
at 14–15; see also FELD, supra note 85, at 3. 
 271 See generally DRINAN, supra note 18, at 15–16 (describing how 200,000 youth are charged in adult 
court each year and thus become potentially subject to extreme sentences like LWOP). 
 272 See, e.g., The Conservative Case for Reform, RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com/the-
conservative-case-for-reform/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (noting that “the corrections system 
must harness the power of charities, faith-based groups, and communities to reform offenders and 
preserve families” while addressing “runaway spending on prisons”). 
 273 See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Superpredators,” Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-
superpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html (“DiIulio . . . conceded today that he wished he had 
never become the 1990’s intellectual pillar for putting violent juveniles in prison and condemning 
them as ‘superpredators.’”); see also Mark L. Earley & Kathryn Wiley, The New Frontier of Public 
Safety, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 343–44 (2011) (expressing regret for support for the 
policies that contributed to mass incarceration during one of the author’s tenures as a Virginia 
State Senator and Attorney General). 
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It is not that the dissenting Justices do not recognize a distinction 
between children and adults; rather, they do not consider adolescents who 
commit crimes as having any continuing moral claim to the category of child-
ness.  In each of the juvenile LWOP cases, the dissenting Justices lampoon 
the majority’s insistence on calling the defendants children, deploying scare 
quotes and implied judgments of absurdity to hammer home this point.  
“The majority,” notes Justice Scalia, “presumably regards any person one 
day short of voting age as a ‘child.’”274  The majority, writes Justice Alito 
seemingly in a state of shock, thinks that “a 17½-year-old who sets off a 
bomb in a crowded mall or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a 
‘child.’”275  Child-ness, for Justice Alito, seems not to be a chronological or 
biological fact about a person, but rather a qualitative signifier that 
connotes something like innocence or value to society.276  By definition, 
committing horrific crimes removes one from that category, disproving that 
one has the necessary characteristics for the “child” honorific.  (In the 
majority’s view, in contrast, child-ness is simply a chronological and 
biological status, and by definition, when someone still has that status, 
heightened procedures should attend any decision to write them off 
forever.)  Later Justice Alito makes the point again, more explicitly: “The 
category of murderers that the Court delicately calls ‘children’ (murderers 
under the age of 18) consists overwhelmingly of young men who are fast 
approaching the legal age of adulthood.”277  If forced to select a single word 
to identify these people, Justice Alito would certainly not choose the word 
“child”—in his view, a misleading euphemism.  But, it seems, he also would 
not choose the word “man,” or “adult,” although he might think those a 
slightly better fit.  He would choose the word “murderer.” 
 
 274 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 744 n.2 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 275 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 510 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 276 Significantly, Justice Alito’s rhetoric here echoes a long tradition of American discourse in which 
black children, notwithstanding their age, were not bestowed with the cultural attributes of 
“childhood” status.  See, e.g., AGYEPONG, supra note 258, at 13–14 (describing how, in the 
Progressive Era, childhood was idealized as a time of innocence and purity, yet black children 
were instead portrayed in popular culture as “wild,” “savage-like,” and impervious to physical 
pain).  Such tropes have proven remarkably durable in the American mind.  Today, psychological 
studies continue to document that black youth tend to be misperceived as older than they actually 
are and viewed as less innocent than their white counterparts of the same age.  See, e.g., Phillip 
Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526 (2014).  I do not mean to suggest that Justice Alito 
consciously means to invoke or endorse the view that children differ by race, but rather to 
highlight the danger of rhetoric that opens the door for the possibility that some children are not 
“really” children in a society with a history of selectively dehumanizing particular groups.  
 277 Miller, 567 U.S.  at 513. 
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C.  Where To? 
Because they rely so heavily on an essentialized distinction between 
youth and adults, the juvenile LWOP cases could have the effect of 
entrenching the constitutional status of LWOP and other extreme prison 
sentences for adults.  Particularly now that Justice Kennedy has retired, it 
seems likely that a majority of the Roberts Court in future cases will seek to 
limit rather than expand upon Miller.  If so, the language in Miller sharply 
distinguishing between youth and adults could form the basis for 
subsequent decisions cabining the (already limited) holdings of Graham and 
Miller to juveniles and juveniles only.  
Alternatively, it is theoretically possible that Miller will instead pave the 
way towards incremental changes in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it 
applies to adults, constituting an opening wedge towards more robust 
constitutional review of criminal sentencing overall.  Although Miller is 
replete with asides that seem to imply adults are fixed, those asides could be 
discarded as dicta in future cases.  Justice Kagan might, with apologies to 
Justice Cardozo, re-read her Miller opinion “with due contrition” one day, 
and notice “all sorts of cracks and crevices and loopholes” that she did not 
intend to include.278  Prohibitions on birth control, after all, were first 
invalidated in Griswold v. Connecticut as a violation of marital privacy, in an 
opinion replete with judicial praise for the institution of marriage.279  In 
light of Griswold’s rhetoric, one might have predicted at the time that the 
Court would never extend the right to contraception beyond the distinctive 
setting of the marital bedroom.  And yet, seven years later the Court relied 
on Griswold in overturning a contraception ban as applied to unmarried 
individuals.280  Moreover, if the Court actually takes neuroscience seriously, 
then perhaps changing scientific understandings of young adulthood will 
ultimately inform the Court’s analysis.  Recent findings in neuroscience 
suggest that some brain functions continue developing through the mid-
twenties and perhaps beyond.281  If so, then perhaps the special 
 
 278 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29–30 (1921). 
 279 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (extolling marriage as “sacred”). 
 280 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives 
to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be 
equally impermissible.”); see also Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of 
Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 135 (2015) (tracing this doctrinal trajectory). 
 281 See, e.g., Richard Alleyne, Brain Only Fully ‘Matures’ in Middle Age, Claims Neuroscientist, TELEGRAPH 
(Dec. 16, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/news/8204782/Brain-only-
fully-matures-in-middle-age-claims-neuroscientist.html (“Brain scans have shown that the prefrontal 
cortex . . . continues to change shape in your 30s and 40s.”); Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen 
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considerations that Graham and Miller require for juveniles could be 
extended to adults,282 or at least to categories of adult defendants who can, 
exploiting the Court’s apparent receptivity to neuroscience, offer evidence 
that they suffer from a particular mental illness or addiction that makes 
them arguably analogous to adolescents.283 
Still, even this possibility of incremental reform is limited in the face of 
mass incarceration.  Even if the Court might gradually come to define 
LWOP as grossly disproportionate for certain types of adults (or for certain 
types of crimes), or to impose more individualized procedural requirements 
on extremely harsh prison sentences, regulating imprisonment only for 
special groups or at its harshest extremes is unlikely to diminish the overall 
scale of the carceral state.  Few would argue, then, that Graham and Miller 
provide resources for a wholesale assault on mass incarceration.284  As John 
Stinneford accurately notes, the Eighth Amendment as currently 
interpreted by the Court effectively leaves “the vast majority of 
 
Years, NPR (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=141164708 (“[E]merging science about brain development suggests that most 
people don’t reach full maturity until the age 25.”);  see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie & 
Laurence Steinberg, Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice 
Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 642 (2016) (explaining that development psychologists and 
neuroscientists have established that brain development continues “well beyond the age of 
majority”); Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration, 2018 
WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3138750 (noting 
that the prefrontal cortex continues to develop into the early 20s).  
 282 For examples of scholarly arguments in favor of extending Miller to adults, see, for example, Berry, 
supra note 101, at 347 (noting that “adults are no less human than juveniles are” and that some are 
likely to prove “redeemable”); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller 
to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087, 1138 (2013) (“[T]he Court’s approach leaves room for lower courts 
to begin the process of extending . . . Miller and developing principled limitations on the imposition 
of LWOP on adult offenders.”); Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 472–74 (arguing that Miller 
should be extended to prohibit LWOP for nonviolent drug offenses); cf. Frank O. Bowman, III, 
Juvenile Lifers and Judicial Overreach: A Curmudgeonly Meditation on Miller v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 
1015, 1034, 1038 (2013) (arguing—and ultimately lamenting—that the rationale of Miller cannot 
logically be cabined to juveniles or LWOP).  But see Gertner, supra note 23, at 1043 (expressing 
doubt that Miller portends any broader constitutional right to proportional sentencing). 
 283 See Gertner, supra note 23, at 1051 & n.84 (suggesting as possible examples those with “a 
particular diagnosis of mental impairment” that have “a distinctive fMRI signature,” or addicts 
with adolescent-like impulsivity and susceptibility to treatment; but noting that these analogies are 
necessarily “imperfect”). 
 284 For instance, Smith and Robinson argue for readings of the Eighth Amendment to prohibit LWOP 
for juvenile homicide offenders, LWOP for non-violent drug offenses, and the death penalty.  
Smith & Robinson, supra note 28, at 469–79.  Although I am broadly sympathetic to what I take to 
be their policy views on each of these subjects, I am confused about their implication that such 
doctrinal shifts would “reinvent” the Eighth Amendment into a robust protection against carceral 
excess.  The vast majority of prisoners do not fall into any of these categories.  
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offenders . . .unprotected,”285 and the juvenile LWOP cases seem unlikely 
to change that reality.  This lack of protection makes sense, however, when 
the jurisprudence is understood as reflecting an underlying principle that 
punishment itself is not inherently problematic or suspect, only that it may 
require special procedural regulation for particular groups or exceptional 
categories.  This view requires some default group for whom the Eighth 
Amendment imposes no real limits on legislative sentencing determinations 
or the length of imprisonment.  In Graham and Miller, that default group is 
essentially “all adults.”  Perhaps that group will become chipped away at 
over time, but the majority of adults will presumably continue to fall into it. 
IV.  IMAGINING CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Highlighting the shared constitutional equanimity about mass 
imprisonment that unites the majority and dissenting opinions in the 
juvenile LWOP cases brings into relief what is missing in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  At present, no member of the Roberts Court 
has articulated a reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
mediated through a perspective that might be called “carceral skepticism.”  
Justice Sotomayor’s expressions of concern about the antidemocratic 
tendencies of the “carceral state” in her Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
perhaps come closest.  What might it mean to read the Eighth Amendment 
in such a way?  Offered in the spirit of a thought experiment, this Part 
briefly surveys some bodies of thought that might offer conceptual resources 
for developing a “carceral skeptical” reading of the Eighth Amendment: 
prison abolitionism, comparative constitutional law, and even originalism.   
This Part is offered primarily to bring into relief the limits of the current 
Court’s position.  To be sure, the current Court is unlikely to adopt 
anything remotely like a prison abolitionist perspective any time soon.  But 
the exercise of imagining alternatives can be a helpful way of denaturalizing 
the status quo.  To draw again upon the equal protection scholarship on 
“mediating principles,” the Court’s purposive commitments can change 
over time in the course of popular constitutional contestation.  In Pamela 
Karlan and Sam Issacharoff’s conception, mediating principles do not 
solely come from the Court, but are sometimes arrived at “democratically,” 
 
 285 Stinneford, supra note 15, at 494.  Berry suggests “a constitutional framework for curbing mass 
incarceration,” although it is neither clear how many offenders the proposed framework would 
help nor how exactly it could be connected to existing jurisprudence.  See Berry, supra note 28, at 
67, 69–70 (noting that the Supreme Court has failed to establish “broader guiding principles 
delineating the boundary between acceptable and impermissible punishments”). 
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through “bottom-up political negotiation.”286  When that happens, the 
choice for the Court is whether to reject or accept the democratically 
developed mediating principle.287  Perhaps the rising tide of activism 
against mass incarceration will one day put the Court to that choice.  
A.  Prison Abolitionism 
Prison abolitionism is best understood as an aspirational long-term 
vision around which to orient political organizing, not a literal call for the 
immediate or indiscriminate shuttering of prisons.288  The prison abolition 
movement seeks to imagine, develop, and institute alternative ways of 
preventing and responding to violence and interpersonal harm that do not 
rely on “punishment and imprisonment.”289  Ultimately, this movement 
envisions a future in which “safety and security will not be premised on 
violence or the threat of violence” at the hands of the state, but rather upon 
“a collective commitment to guaranteeing the survival and care of all 
peoples.”290  Grounded in frank recognition of the moral travesty of the 
past forty years of mass incarceration, the form of abolition called for by 
this movement “may be understood . . . as a gradual project of 
decarceration, in which radically different legal and institutional regulatory 
forms supplant criminal law enforcement.”291  Despite growing concern 
about mass incarceration and abusive policing within the legal academy, as 
Allegra McLeod points out, legal scholars and jurists tend to consider 
genuinely abolitionist solutions to be “generally unfathomable.”292  Instead, 
reform calls tend to target only “the occasional, peripheral excesses of 
imprisonment”—which is, of course, an apt description of the juvenile 
LWOP cases, which could be read to construct JLWOP as a “peripheral 
excess” of an otherwise sound system—rather than taking on “the core 
 
 286 Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 51, at 39. 
 287 Id. 
 288 See Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1167–68 
(2015) (defining prison abolitionism as “an aspirational ethical, institutional, and political 
framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and collective social life, rather 
than simply a plan to tear down prison walls”). 
 289  What is the PIC? What is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://criticalresistance.org/about/ 
not-so-common-language/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018); see also McLeod, supra note 288, at 1167–
68 (explaining that the prison abolition movement “focuse[s] on structural reform[s] rather than 
individualized criminal targeting” with the end goal of rendering prisons obsolete). 
 290 INCITE!-Critical Resistance Statement, INCITE!, https://incite-national.org/incite-critical-
resistance-statement/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2018)  
 291 McLeod, supra note 288, at 1161. 
 292 Id. at 1160. 
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operations of criminal law enforcement.”293  
In an alternative universe where a prison abolitionist could be 
confirmed to the Supreme Court, how might such a jurist read the Eighth 
Amendment?  When assessing the legitimacy of imprisonment, an 
abolitionist jurist would take stock not only of the theoretical justifications 
for punishment but also of the actual history of “the dehumanizing nature 
and racially subordinating legacy of criminal punishment in American 
society.”294  Presumably, she would therefore begin from the premise that 
imprisonment has demonstrated itself suspect.  As McLeod writes, an 
abolitionist ethic would move beyond “simply eliminating incarceration for 
nonviolent, nonserious, nonfelony convictions,” which would make little 
dent in the prison population, and consider that “[e]ven people convicted 
of serious, violent felonies . . . should be able to live their lives outside of 
cages.”295  Thus, an abolitionist reading of the Eighth Amendment would 
surely reject the premise that anyone can be presumed “incorrigible,” and 
thus require some meaningful possibility of eventual release for every 
prisoner.  (Such a position may seem outlandish from the American 
perspective, but it is the norm in Europe.)296  An abolitionist jurist would 
also presumably be far more receptive than is the current Court to the 
remedy of actually releasing people from prison.297  There may be no 
straightforward path from current doctrine to an abolitionist Eighth 
Amendment.  Yet it is helpful to contrast this vision of constitutional 
jurisprudence with our current one, because it illuminates the extent to 
which imprisonment even for very long terms is generally presumed 
 
 293 Id. at 1161. 
 294 Id. at 1235. 
 295 Id. at 1170; see also GOTTSCHALK, supra note 97, at 2. 
 296 See Kleinfeld, supra note 18, at 955 (discussing how European punishment regimes generally 
embody the premise that people are not incorrigible).  
 297 For an example of a doctrinal argument that sounds in this vein (without characterizing itself as 
abolitionist), see generally Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1575 (2012) (arguing for more expansive use of release from prison as a remedy 
for constitutional violations, rather than more limited remedies such as resentencing or monetary 
damages).  In a more reformist vein, see generally Berry, supra note 28 (arguing for more rigorous 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny of, inter alia, adult LWOP, mandatory minimum sentences, and 
sentences over ten years for non-violent offenses, as a “framework” for “curbing mass 
incarceration”).  For a new Eighth Amendment framework “grounded in our political morality”, 
see Sigler, supra note 65, at 406.  Another possibility is suggested by scholarly proposals to 
incorporate “strict scrutiny” into Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Ian P. Farrell, Strict 
Scrutiny Under the Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2013); see also Sherry F. Colb, 
Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 NYU L. REV. 781, 784 
(1994) (arguing that “the Court should apply strict scrutiny when evaluating criminal laws 
imposing imprisonment as a penalty”). 
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legitimate by all wings of the court.  
B.  International Comparisons  
Comparative constitutional law also provides resources for imagining an 
alternative Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that would provide a more 
substantial challenge to mass imprisonment.  The use of international 
comparisons to inform United States constitutional law is, of course, a 
disputed interpretive practice.298  Nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that 
the Court’s thin reading of the Eighth Amendment contributes to the 
United States’ status as an international outlier when it comes to 
punishment.  Surely one factor enabling (though not, of course, 
determining) the United States’ extremely punitive approach to 
governance, and mass incarceration more specifically, is the absence of 
meaningful constitutional review of prison sentences.299  
The relative weakness of the Eighth Amendment is somewhat 
exceptional, compared to analogous provisions in other legal traditions.   
Of course, one of the most exceptional features of the United States 
Constitution, as it relates to punishment, is that it does not categorically 
prohibit the death penalty.  In contrast, the constitutions of virtually all 
wealthy industrialized democracies (with the exception of the United States 
and Japan) contain express and unequivocal constitutional prohibitions of 
capital punishment.⁠300  But the Supreme Court’s refusal to read the Eighth 
 
 298 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 109, 109–10 (2005). 
 299 The causes of the “punitive turn” are the subject of a vast and growing literature spanning 
sociology, history, political science, and law.  For a comparative account that emphasizes cultural 
differences between Europe and the United States, see generally WHITMAN, supra note 98.  A 
growing historical literature tends to emphasize the postwar politics of race, urban crisis, and 
backlash against the New Deal welfare state.  See e.g., HINTON, supra note 259; KOHLER-
HAUSSMAN, supra note 201.  Of course, there is something of a chicken-egg quality to my perhaps 
heroic attempt in this Article to isolate constitutional doctrine from the other factors driving U.S. 
punitiveness.  If one accepts the arguments of Michael Klarman and others that the Supreme 
Court has functioned historically as a basically majoritarian institution, then perhaps the lack of 
constitutional limits was itself a function of the punitive turn in politics.  See KLARMAN, supra note 
84.  But see EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2013) (emphasizing the contingency of the Court’s near-brush with 
abolishing the death penalty in the 1970s). 
 300 E.g., 1958 CONST. art. 66-1 (Fr.) (“No one shall be sentenced to death.”); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] 
[CONSTITUTION] 2:4 (Swed.) (“There shall be no capital punishment.”); CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE 
[CST] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18 1999, title 2, ch. 1, art. 10, para. 1 (Switz.) (“Every person has a 
right to life.  The death penalty is prohibited.”).  Some countries retain the death penalty for treason 
but effectively prohibit capital punishment for ordinary, domestic crime.  See, e.g., 1993 CONST. ch. 
VIII, art. 140 (Peru) (“The death penalty shall only be applied for in offense of treason in wartime 
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Amendment as a meaningful limit on LWOP—outside, thus far, of the 
juvenile context—further contributes to the United States’ outlier status.  In 
Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), a fractured majority of the Court affirmed a 
mandatory LWOP sentence for cocaine possession.⁠301  In contrast, the 
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) has outlawed LWOP 
sentences altogether as a violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.302  Applying its own precedents barring “grossly disproportionate” 
sentences and favoring rehabilitation, the ECHR held that all prison 
sentences must provide some opportunity for “review” to determine 
whether “such progress towards rehabilitation has been made . . . that 
continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological 
grounds.”303  
Canadian constitutional law provides additional resources for imagining 
alternatives.  In a provision that closely echoes the Eighth Amendment, 
Canada’s Charter guarantees “the right not to be subjected to any cruel and 
unusual treatment or punishment.”304  Yet unlike the United States 
Supreme Court, the Canadian Supreme Court—as Vicki Jackson 
describes—has infused real meaning into this language, leveraging the 
provision to engage in rigorous proportionality review of criminal 
sentences.305  For example, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated a 
seven-year mandatory minimum for narcotics distribution offenses as grossly 
disproportionate.306  Of course, a seven-year sentence frankly appears quite 
lenient in comparison to some of the sentences that the United States 
Supreme Court has upheld against Eighth Amendment challenges.  
 
and of terrorism . . . .”).  The Constitute Project’s online search tool yields 75 constitutions with a 
“prohibition of capital punishment” provision.  Explore Constitutions, CONSTITUTE PROJECT 
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=cappun&status=in_force (last visited Nov. 
12, 2018).  
 301 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991). 
 302 Vinter v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 44. 
 303 Id.  Exemplifying the disparity between European and American punishment practices, that 
decision only directly affected one country, because every other European country had already 
abolished LWOP legislatively.  And that country was the United Kingdom, which had only forty-
nine prisoners serving LWOP.  Dominic Casciani, Killers’ Life Terms ‘Breach Their Human Rights,’ 
BBC NEWS (July 9, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-23230419.  As of 2009, there were 
more than 41,000 prisoners serving LWOP in the United States.  Ashley Nellis & Ryan S. King, 
No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life Sentences in America, SENTENCING PROJECT (July 2009), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/No-Exit-The-Expanding-
Use-of-Life-Sentences-in-America.pdf. 
 304 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, § 12 (U.K.). 
 305 Jackson, supra note 71, at 3186–87. 
 306 R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.R. 1045 (Can.); see also Jackson, supra note 71, at 3186–87. 
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These comparisons are not intended to suggest that these European and 
Canadian decisions have necessarily yielded transformative practical effects 
for punishment practices on the ground.  To the contrary, advocates report 
disappointment that these decisions have subsequently been interpreted 
and enforced in relatively limited ways.307  To be sure, were the United 
States to move toward similar doctrine there would still remain the separate 
question of how to translate the doctrine into meaningful practical change.  
Nevertheless, even if purely at the conceptual level, comparative 
constitutional law provides examples of more robust ways of defining the 
constitutional limitations on punishment. 
C.  Towards an Anti-Carceral Originalism? 
Originalists might object that a “carceral skeptic” reading of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause patently or perhaps even laughably 
contravenes the clause’s original meaning.  Clearly, the Eighth Amendment 
contemplates the continued existence of punishment, of which 
imprisonment is a well-known form.  However, a jurisprudence oriented in 
skepticism toward extremely harsh prison sentences would not necessarily be 
incompatible with originalism.  One possible path to an anti-carceral 
originalism, although admittedly somewhat far afield from the current thrust 
of originalist scholarship and doctrine, would be to reinfuse Eighth 
Amendment interpretation with a more holistic appreciation for the 
Framers’ historical and ideological context.  American Enlightenment 
thinkers shared a fundamental belief that “the present should be better than 
the past and the future better than the present,” and that “reason and 
empirical data” should guide the path of progress, “rather than inherited 
tradition.”308  Legal historian Erin Braatz argues that there is no meaningful 
way to interpret the Eighth Amendment except within this late-eighteenth-
century “milieu” of ferment and experimentation, including 
experimentation in the law and practice of punishment.309  All of the framers 
admired Beccaria, the inaugurator of modern proportionality thinking; they 
all considered the ongoing project of moderating punishments to constitute 
one of the essential projects of “civilizing” progress; and they all agreed that 
 
 307 E-mail from Sharon Dolovich, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to Sara Mayeux Assistant 
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law Sch. (September 30, 2018, 6:02 PM) (on file with author).  I 
thank Sharon Dolovich for suggesting this point and for sharing with me her impressions from 
conversations with British and Canadian colleagues. 
 308 CAROLINE WINTERER, AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENTS: PURSUING HAPPINESS IN THE AGE OF 
REASON 1–2 (2016). 
 309 See generally Braatz, supra note 82. 
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it was not yet clear where this process of “civilizing” punishment might 
ultimately end.310  The phrase “cruel and unusual” was itself intended to 
capture, Braatz argues, that ongoing dynamism, not to freeze constitutional 
limits on punishment in some static place.311 
 But even without going down that path, there is also fodder for a more 
anti-carceral reading of the Eighth Amendment in existing originalist 
scholarship.  In fact, some of the leading scholarly originalist interpretations 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are already quite compatible 
with skepticism about the present-day United States’ historically anomalous 
use of imprisonment.  For instance, John Stinneford makes an originalist 
argument that extremely long prison sentences for certain crimes might 
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because, in Stinneford’s 
view, the original meaning of “cruel” is “unjustly harsh”—without 
requiring any specific intent to cause pain—while “unusual” means 
“contrary to long usage.”312  The Eighth Amendment thus prohibits, 
Stinneford argues, not only the revival of ancient forms of torture but also 
“cruel innovation in punishment.”313  Applying this interpretation, 
Stinneford concludes, might render unconstitutional relatively novel 













 310 Id. at 427, 429–30. 
 311 Id. at 410 & n.18 
 312 Stinneford, Cruel, supra note 82, at 445–47; see also Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 82, at 1745.  
 313 Stinneford, Cruel, supra note 82, at 446–47. 
 314 Id. at 502–03 & n.388; see also id. at 504–06 (discussing the harms of very long prison terms). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article analyzes the judicial rhetoric in the Roberts Court’s trio of 
juvenile LWOP cases in search of insight into the Justices’ underlying 
assumptions about how the Constitution relates to the present crisis of mass 
incarceration.  In Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, a slim majority of the 
Court reads the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause to permit very long prison terms, subject to special procedural 
requirements for certain exceptional groups.  Drawing on longstanding 
cultural tropes of adolescence as a time of flux, the Court constructs youth as 
the paradigmatic such group.  This perspective might be called “carceral 
proceduralism.”  For the Justices in the majority in the juvenile LWOP 
cases, adolescents have uniquely (but transitorily) malleable personalities and 
thus cannot be sentenced to irrevocable forms of punishment without 
certain procedural safeguards, such as individualized sentencing 
determinations and regular parole hearings.  The dissenting Justices in the 
juvenile LWOP cases—whose views could soon command a majority, given 
the retirement of Justice Kennedy—read the Eighth Amendment instead 
from a perspective that might be called “carceral conservatism.”  In this 
view, imprisonment is a positive good that promotes public safety, and 
courts should therefore read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
narrowly, in order to avoid intruding upon the state prerogative to imprison. 
What both wings of the Court share—at least on the evidence thus 
far—is a baseline assumption that adults (at least for purposes of 
constitutional analysis) can be assumed to have fixed characters, are 
potentially incorrigible, and thus can be subjected to permanent forms of 
punishment including life-without-parole.  The archetypal adolescent that 
emerges from Graham and Miller is not necessarily incorrigible.  The 
archetypal adult is potentially irredeemable, and thus can constitutionally 
be written off for all time.315  Thus, the juvenile LWOP cases should not be 
misunderstood as harbingers of genuinely robust constitutional limits on 
punishment.  Writing in dissent in Miller, Justice Alito describes the 
Constitution as a relatively weak source of limits on criminal punishment, 
opining that the Eighth Amendment “for the most part . . . leaves questions 
of sentencing policy to be determined by Congress and the state 
legislatures.”316  While Justice Alito accused the Miller majority of violating 
 
 315 For a provocative argument that this tendency in American criminal law renders it “evil,” see 
Koppelman, supra note 261. 
 316 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 515 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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this background rule, in fact Miller is perfectly consistent with the general 
principle that there are in the United States few meaningful constitutional 
limits on punishment.  For critics of mass incarceration, that may be a 
frightening prospect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
